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Introduction
The papers that constitute the main part of this thesis represent only a small proportion
of the insights and knowledge I accumulated during my time in the Bonn Graduate
School of Economics. It would, hence, be too short-sighted to use this space solely to
discuss and to emphasize the importance of the results I worked out in the main part.
Instead, let me present to you the big picture my work is part of. To do so, I look back
to recapitulate on how my research ideas came to be and how they evolved into full-
fledged economic research papers. Moreover, I want to point out a few misconceptions
I stumbled upon while broadening my knowledge of the law and economics literature.
Two of the three papers that constitute this thesis are situated in a branch of the
literature that is most often referred to as the “economic analysis of contract law”.
This literature, that perhaps began blooming with the seminal work by Shavell (1980),
considers the performance of contracts against the background of so called legal“breach
remedies”. A breach remedy constitutes a standard legal rule that determines the
consequences of a breach of contract. As an example, the default breach remedy of
common law, “expectation damages”, stipulates that the victim of breach receives a
payment that makes her or him, if possible, as well of as performance would have. Given
that such a breach remedy defines the legal background, economists try try to figure
out how an optimal contract should be specified. At this point, for someone who is not
accustomed to the literature it would be natural to enquire what really are the defining
criterions of an optimal contract. The first, and perhaps most important, criterion
that surely springs to an economist’s mind is efficiency. In this respect, a contract is
optimal if it maximizes the expected joint trade surplus of all parties involved. But
should economic efficiency really be the only criterion to consider if one wants to assess
the performance of a contract? This important question is tackled in Chapter I.
From the perspective of “contract theory”, it may be hard to understand the im-
portance of the economic analysis of contract law. Contract theory uses a mechanism
design approach to work out under certain constraints an optimal contract. As an
example for such a constraint, consider that some information may not be verifiable
and thus not contractible. From this point of view, one may wonder what really is
the scope of the economic analysis of contract law. The answer to this question is
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surprisingly straightforward. Breach remedies constitute default rules in contract law
and should hence perform well. It can, however, be the case that contracts governed
by a certain breach remedy fail to induce the first best even though the information
required to operate the remedy is in theory sufficient to do so. This important issue
is raised in Chapter I where a seller makes a so called “hybrid investment” that in-
creases, in expectation, the buyer’s benefit from trade and decreases the seller’s cost
of production. As we will see, “reliance damages”, a breach remedy that is often used
in government contracting, performs poorly unless the benefit-increasing effect is suffi-
ciently strong compared to the cost-decreasing effect of investment. Under the reliance
damages remedy, the victim of breach is reimbursed her or his non-recoverable ex-ante
reliance expenditures. Expectation damages, in contrast, perform surprisingly well not
only in Chapter I but also in Chapter II where a buyer and a seller invest cooperatively
to increase, in expectation, the benefit of their trading partner.
The third chapter of this dissertation is situated in the takings literature. We consider
a situation where a landowner and the government may invest ex-ante, anticipating
the government’s ex-post taking decision. Whereas the landowner invests to increase
the expected private value of her property, the government does so to increase the
expected social value of a public good that can be supplied only if the landowner’s
property is taken ex-post. At this point, you, the reader, may question if and how
Chapter III is connected to the economic analysis of contract law. At first glance, the
two topics seem to be interweaved only very loosely. After all, for a government it
is not feasible to ex-ante sign contracts with every potential victim of a taking. At
this point, it is illuminating to take a glance at the so called “hold-up literature”. It
is a well known result of this literature that parties tend to underinvest in absence
of contractual protection (Williamson, 1979, 1985; Grout, 1984; Grossman and Hart,
1986; Hart and Moore, 1988). Thus, because contracting may often not be possible, law
provides an alternative institution to protect ex-ante investment expenditures. Related
to the function of a contract, governed by some breach remedy, a compensation regime
stipulates a default outcome for the situation that property changes ownership from
the landowner to the government. It thus comes as no surprise, that the optimal
compensation regime derived in Chapter III.3 is related to Cooter’s (1985) notion
of “efficient expectation damages”. Cooter (1985) suggests that expectation damages
should not be calculated on the basis of true but socially efficient investment. In the
same vein, Chapter III.3 demonstrates that the first best is achieved by a regime that
grants as compensation the hypothetical value of the landowner’s property had he or
she invested efficiently.
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Breach Remedies Inducing Hybrid Investments
The research idea behind Chapter I roots back to a seminar I attended back in 2006,
organized by Professors Christoph Engel, Urs Schweizer and Gerhard Wagner, way
before I started my graduate studies. Attending this seminar, I must say, was one of
the best decisions I ever made. To be frank, before taking part, I would never have
imagined how much one can learn from and how interesting it is to apply the tools of an
economist to a supposedly dry subject such as law. Thanks to this seminar, however,
I came to appreciate law and economics and in particular the economic analysis of
contract law. I had to work through an article by Che and Chung (1999) that considers
a situation where a buyer and a seller contract for the future delivery of a good. Before
delivery takes place, the seller makes a so called“cooperative investment”, an investment
that has no value to the outside market but increases the future value of the good to
the buyer. The authors’ focus lies on analyzing the efficiency of standard legal breach
remedies such as expectation damages or reliance damages. Reading their work, I
stumbled upon the following statement:
“In practise, most specific investments have elements of both selfish and cooperative investments. In this
mixed environment, the performance of the contract damages will depend on the relative importance of
each element, so the courts must evaluate the nature of underlying reliance investments in determining
a remedy.”
— Yeon-Koo Che and Tai-Yeong Chung
Their reasoning left me back puzzled. The underlying idea, I figured, is that ex-
pectation damages outperform reliance damages if investment is purely “selfish”, i.e.
increases in expectation the benefit of the investing party, as has been demonstrated
by Shavell (1980) and Rogerson (1984). Moreover, Che and Chung (1999) claim to
have demonstrated the superiority of reliance damages in a setting of purely coopera-
tive investment. Thus, in a mixed environment the performance of a contract remedy
must depend on the relative importance of each element, right? Few years later, now
a graduate student in the Bonn Graduate School of Economics, I had to get started
on my first research project. Pondering over research ideas, I remembered Che and
Chung’s (1999) article and more importantly their statement that left me back puzzled
few years before in the seminar. Hence, as a first project, it appeared natural to me
to find out if their conjecture was true. To do so, my aim was to explicitly model a
situation where investment is of a hybrid nature, i.e. influences both the buyer’s benefit
from trade and the seller’s cost of production. At a very early stage of the project,
during which I was playing around with the model setup, I had a fruitful discussion
with my colleague Alexander Stremitzer. I knew that Alexander was currently working
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on a paper in which he demonstrates that it is indeed possible to achieve the first best
with a contract governed by expectation damages in Che and Chung’s (1999) setting.
What I did not know was that he had, about the same time as me, the idea to analyze
the performance of expectation damages in a setting of hybrid investment. We were
both amazed that we, independent of each other, had a very similar research idea in
mind. It comes as no surprise that we decided to work together.
The main finding of our work is twofold. First, we show that it is possible to induce
the first best using a so called “Cadillac contract”, governed by expectation damages.
Second, we demonstrate that reliance damages induce overinvestment if investment
is sufficiently selfish. A Cadillac contract, as defined by Edlin (1996), specifies the
highest possible quantity and/or quality combined with a sufficiently low price. In
his article, Edlin (1996) analyzes the efficiency of expectation damages in a setting
of selfish investment. If the seller is the investing party, he demonstrates that if the
parties write a Cadillac contract a sufficiently low contract price ensures that it will
always be the investing seller who breaches the contract. Consequently, the seller, as
the breaching party, is in the position of a residual claimant of the trade relationship.
In order to make the seller accept such a low price, the contract also specifies up-front
lump sum payment from the buyer to the seller.
Our result differs in two respects. First, we are concerned with inducing hybrid
investments as opposed to purely selfish investments. While efficient purely selfish
investments, in our setting, could be achieved through a contract that specifies the
highest possible quantity but is silent about quality, parties need to specify the highest
possible quantity and the highest possible quality level in order to achieve first best
hybrid investments. This is because the value increasing effect of investment can only
be internalized through the seller’s expected damage payments which arise when quality
is non-conforming to the contract. The second major difference to Edlin (1996) is that
we do not rely on up-front payments as, in equilibrium, the bilateral breach game
considered in Chapter I leads to the same payoff profile for the investing party as if we
assumed that only the seller may breach the contract. Parties can therefore use the
contract price as an instrument to divide the expected gains from trade.
The intuition behind our result that reliance damages may induce the seller to over-
invest can be explained as follows. Compared to Che and Chung (1999), the seller has
additional incentives to invest in our setting. We explain that he or she internalizes
the cost-decreasing effect of his or her investment regardless of whether the parties
trade the good or not. In contrast, a benevolent social planner does not internalize
this cost-decreasing effect of investment in those states of the world where trade is
undesirable from a social perspective. It is thus clear that if the investment incen-
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tives generated by this cost-decreasing effect are sufficiently strong, the seller has an
incentive to overinvest.
Chapter I closes the gap between Edlin (1996) and Stremitzer (2010). If just one
party invests, a well-specified contract governed by expectation damages induces the
first best regardless of whether investment is of a cooperative, hybrid or selfish nature.
Since reliance damages perform poorly if investment is selfish (see e.g. Shavell, 1980;
Rogerson, 1984) and, as we demonstrated, hybrid, courts have no reason to evaluate
the nature of underlying reliance investments to determine a remedy, as proposed in
Che and Chung (1999). The main role for alternative regimes such as reliance damages
therefore is to offer alternative solutions for situations where informational constraints
render them easier to assess than expectation damages.
Expectation Damages and Bilateral Cooperative
Investments
Chapter II undoubtedly can be regarded as the cornerstone of this thesis. Before
discussing how the research idea behind it came to be, let me call attention to a con-
tribution that should not be overlooked. I created a generally applicable machinery
that does not require differentiability and allows me to derive results, in my opinion,
in a very elegant way. The reason I felt the urge to create a new model framework
can be traced back to the paper that constitutes Chapter I of this thesis. Because
our work is closely related to the article by Che and Chung (1999), Alexander and
I decided to stay as close as possible to their model framework. This decision had,
however, its drawbacks. Using an augmented version of their model setup, our proofs
turned out to be more tedious to read than was acceptable. We figured that we had to
balance generality against readability and implemented the following two design deci-
sions. First, we decided that variable costs and the buyer’s valuation are stochastically
independent and second that the highest possible benefit of the buyer is equal to the
highest possible realization of variable cost. The first decision can be justified by the
fact that, in theory, it is easier to align the parties incentives in a setting of positive
stochastic dependence. To be perfectly honest, the second decision that is in a sense a
simplifying assumption, sounds weird. To our defense, our results remain qualitatively
the same if this assumption is relaxed.
Nonetheless, when I sat at my desk pondering over a new research idea, that in-
volved bilateral investment by both the buyer and the seller, I realized the following.
Compared to Che and Chung (1999), the situation I was interested in is more diffi-
cult to analyze. If I decided to use a model setup related to theirs, I was likely to
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run into readability problems again. It thus figures that I had to start from scratch.
Scouring the literature for inspiration, I yet again came across a marvelous article I
red before, Schweizer (2006). In his work, Professor Schweizer, like Che and Chung
(1999), considers a setting of unilateral cooperative investment. In contrast, however,
Schweizer’s (2006) analysis is a lot easier to read and does not require any function to
be differentiable. My setting is different to the one of Schweizer (2006) in two respects:
Ex-ante, both parties may invest and ex-post both parties may breach the contract.
Using his work as inspiration, I thus created a new model framework.
The economic research idea behind Chapter II also roots back to the time I was
working on the joint project with Alexander. Reading the literature, I realized that
there exists an important gap in the economic analysis of contract law. Several papers
analyze the performance of expectation damages in a setting of unilateral and cooper-
ative investment (see e.g. Che and Chung, 1999; Schweizer, 2006; Stremitzer, 2010).
The papers that consider bilateral investment, restrict themselves, however, on purely
selfish investment (see e.g. Edlin and Reichelstein, 1996; Ohlendorf, 2009). The gap
may exist due to a well known result by Che and Hausch (1999), who also consider bi-
lateral investment but are situated in the contract theory literature. They demonstrate
under the strict assumption that courts are not able to verify any direct or indirect
signal about investment and the state of the world that contracting becomes irrelevant
if investment is sufficiently cooperative. From their work, I could thus deduce that the
situation I was interested in was, in theory, the most difficult to solve. The articles
that anaylze contract law work, however, under less strict assumptions than Che and
Hausch (1999). My aim thus was to demonstrate that a contract governed by expecta-
tion damages can solve the parties’ contracting problem if investment is bilateral and
of a purely cooperative nature. Moreover, to enforce the contract, a court should not
need more information than is required in Edlin and Reichelstein (1996) or Ohlendorf
(2009).
From working together with Alexander and also from reading Edlin (1996), I knew
that an optimal Cadillac contract induces efficient investment incentives if only one
party invests. But more importantly, they are also very robust. As an example, consider
Chapter I where our first-best result holds for a wide range of prices. If the seller is the
investing party, an optimal Cadillac contract stipulates a very high quality such that
the buyer receives damages due to non-conformity of the good. Hence, as discussed in
the previous section, the seller becomes a residual claimant of the trade relationship.
If the buyer is protected in the sense that he or she is compensated by the seller if
quality falls below a certain level, wouldn’t it make sense to consider that the seller is
protected in a similar way, I asked myself. More importantly, would this distort the
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seller’s investment incentives? I quickly rushed to my desk to analyze what happens if
the parties not only specify a quality- but also a cost-threshold such that any cost above
the latter threshold are borne by the buyer. What I found can be seen as a testimony
to the robustness of Cadillac contracts. If the specified price is sufficiently low, adding
a cost-threshold does not distort the seller’s investment incentives. In Chapter II, I
explain that this enables the parties to use the cost-threshold as an instrument to
balance the buyer’s incentives. An optimal contract in my setting, which I refer to as
an augmented Cadillac contract, thus combines aspects from Cadillac contracts as in
Edlin (1996) and balancing contracts (see e.g. Chung, 1991; Edlin and Reichelstein,
1996; Ohlendorf, 2009). Alternatively, the parties can specify a sufficiently low cost-
threshold such that the buyer becomes a residual claimant and use the quality-threshold
to balance the seller’s incentives.
To understand the importance of my result, it has to be put in context with the
preexisting literature. At this point, it is instructive to consider the following statement
by Edlin (1996) about the performance of expectation damages:
“This article shows that up-front payments can eliminate the overinvestment effect identified by Shavell
(1980), by controlling which party breaches a contract. At the same time, ”Cadillac” contracts (con-
tracts for a very high quality or quantity) can protect against underinvestment due to Williamsonian
holdups. This combination provides efficient investment incentives when courts use expectation dam-
ages as a remedy for breach. The expectation damages remedy is therefore well-suited to multidimen-
sional but one-sided investment problems, in contrast to specific performance, which is well-suited to
two-sided but umdimensional investment problems.”
— Aaron S. Edlin
The basic idea behind Edlin’s statement is that Edlin and Reichelstein (1996) have
supposedly demonstrated that expectation damages perform poorly if both the buyer
and the seller make a selfish investment. However, as Ohlendorf (2009) has pointed out,
this can be attributed to Edlin and Reichelstein’s (1996) assumption of a deterministic
and linear cost function: If it is sufficiently concave, expectation damages can indeed
induce the first best in Edlin and Reichelstein’s (1996) setting. If only one party invests,
Che and Chung (1999) claim that expectation damages do not induce any investment
incentives at all. However, Schweizer (2006) and Stremitzer (2010) demonstrate, in
a slightly richer contractual framework than the one considered in Che and Chung
(1999), that the first best can yet again be achieved under the expectation damage
remedy. There are two important lessons to be learned. First, in order to judge the
performance of a remedy, economists should consider a variety of contracts and not
restrict themselves to one specific setup. Second, that in all settings examined so far
it is possible to induce the first best with a reasonable simple contract governed by
expectation damages.
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Economic Analysis of Taking Rules: the Bilateral Case
The origin of the research idea that constitutes Chapter III can be found in one of
the many discussions I had with my colleague Michael Hewer. Being an economist,
I am always eager to discuss legal cases as this is perhaps the best way to develop
an understanding of how legal scholars think. Michael, who besides economics also
studied law seemed to be the predestined person to talk to. On the one hand, he
has a good knowledge of the law. On the other, as an economist, he understands
my arguments that sometimes are in stark contrast to what the law stipulates. One
day, we discussed a situation where a government used its power of eminent domain
on behalf of an airport, that planned to construct a new runway. Michael reasoned
that this is a predestined example of why it is important that a government has the
power of eminent domain. In absence of this power the landowner would have, he
argued, an incentive to delay her or his sale to extract some of the airport’s profits.
Moreover, he continued, law stipulates that private property should only be taken for
public use and not without just compensation.1 ”What does just compensation really
mean?”, I inquired. Scouring the legal literature, we found that just compensation is
most commonly interpreted as fair market value. In other words, the victim of a taking
should receive as compensation the hypothetical value of her or his property in absence
of the risk of a taking. This interpretation left us back puzzled. If the landowner
is fully compensated, he or she is fully insured and thus has an incentive to ex-ante
overinvest in her or his property. It was at this point that we rushed to our desks to
develop a model to analyze how different commonly proposed compensation regimes
affect the landowner’s incentives. What we should have done before, however, is to
carefully scout the economic literature. Blume et al. (1984) have, about twenty-six
years before us, analyzed a model similar to ours and therefore derived very similar
results. Time to start from scratch.
Scouring the literature also had its positives. We came across an interesting article,
Hermalin (1995), that considers a situation where the government or state may have
non-benevolent motives but where, as in Blume et al. (1984), only the landowner
invests. Trying to defend why a government or state may not solely follow benevolent
motives, Hermalin (1995) argues:
“In legal writing one motive for compensating a citizen for taken property is to restrain the state from
the tyrannical use of its rights of regulation or eminent domain. That is, the state is assumed not
to act benevolently but to act on behalf of the interest of the majority (i.e., the rest of society) while
essentially ignoring the interest of the individual property owner.”
— Benjamin E. Hermalin
1See e.g. the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
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This statement is what really got us started. If an important motive for compensation
is to affect not only the incentives of a potential victim of a taking but also those of the
government, it makes sense to consider a situation where also the government invests
ex-ante. Several examples popped up in our mind. A government that evaluates if a
certain parcel of land is suitable to use as a disposal site for nuclear waste surely must
inquire about the area’s geological conditions and infrastructure. Moreover, the airport
mentioned before also has ex-ante expenditures. It needs to develop a construction plan
and analyze the expected profit associated with constructing the new runway. We thus
rushed back to our desks to develop a model to represent the situations we had in
mind. We decided to follow Hermalin’s (1995) notion of a non-benevolent government.
In our work, the government suffers from “fiscal” illusion in the sense that its perceived
cost of a taking is equal to the amount of compensation it has to pay. Consequently, it
has an incentive to initiate a taking whenever the social benefit of the taking exceeds
compensation. What we essentially had to analyze is, as in Chapter II, a situation of
bilateral investment. It goes without saying that it was not a hard decision to adopt
the machinery I developed there.
In our work, we demonstrate that all standard compensation regimes perform poorly.
If the victim of a taking is fully compensated, he or she is fully insured and therefore
has an incentive to ex-ante overinvest in his or her property. Our finding is thus
in line with the literature, confirming the result of Blume et al. (1984). Advocates
of the full compensation regime may like to read that, at least, the government has
efficient incentives. Because it essentially compares the social benefit to the amount of
compensation it has to pay, it takes the property whenever the social benefit exceeds
the value of the landowner’s property. Because the government’s taking decision is
efficient, it internalizes the benefit of its investment in exactly the same states of the
world a benevolent social planner would do so and therefore has efficient incentives to
invest. In contrast, if the landowner is not compensated at all as proposed in Blume et
al. (1984), the government always takes her or his property. It is not surprising that
the landowner has no incentive to invest ex-ante. Hermalin (1995) suggests a regime
where the landowner receives as compensation the entire social benefit of the taking.
This makes, he argues, the landowner a residual claimant of the trade relationship who
consequently has efficient investment incentives. The main problem of this regime is,
however, that the government’s ex-post payoff is essentially zero. Ex-ante, it therefore
has no incentive to invest. All commonly proposed standard compensation regimes
perform, in one way or another, rather poorly in our setting. We are, however, able
to demonstrate that there does exist a compensation regime that induces the first
best. Under this regime, the landowner receives as compensation the hypothetical
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value of her or his property had he or she invested efficiently. What is crucial here
is that neither the government’s taking decision nor its ex-post payoff depend on the
landowner’s investment. If the government invests efficiently, it internalizes the benefit
of its investment in exactly the same states of the world a benevolent social planner
would do so. Thus, the government has no incentive to deviate from the socially optimal
investment level. Given that the government invests efficiently, we demonstrate that
the landowner is a residual claimant of the bilateral relationship and also has efficient
incentives to invest.
As a benchmark, we consider the situation that the government is benevolent, i.e.
maximizes expected social welfare. Assuming that the government cannot ex-ante
commit itself on an ex-post inefficient taking decision, it is sufficient to analyze the
landowner’s incentives. Ex-post, the government initiates a taking whenever it is
socially desirable to do so and ex-ante it chooses the socially best response to the
landowner’s investment. We demonstrate, under two plausible assumptions, that any
compensation regime other than the social benefit compensation regime, proposed by
Hermalin (1995), induces the landowner to overinvest in her or his property. Our first
assumption is that the government is wealth constrained in the sense that it cannot
raise capital above the social benefit of the taking. The second assumption is that we
only consider compensation regimes in which compensation is non-decreasing in the
landowner’s investment. Intuitively, the landowner has an incentive to overinvest for
two reasons. First, in contrast to the objective of a benevolent social planner, the
landowner’s investment may increase the expected amount of compensation whereas it
does not affect the value of the public good. Second, in case of a taking, the landowner
only receives compensation instead of the social benefit of the taking. She thus has an
incentive to overinvest to reduce the probability that a taking takes place. Under the
social benefit compensation regime both sources of inefficiency do not exist.
The significance of our work can only be understood if we consider how our main
results are connected to each other. Perhaps naively, one may think that society must
be better of under a benevolent government. After all, in equilibrium, the government
chooses the socially best response to what the landowner does. Our work highlights,
however, that this must not be the case. If the government, perhaps due to public
pressure, can only pay compensation less than the social benefit of the taking, there
does not exist any compensation regime to induce the first best under a benevolent
government. If it is non-benevolent, we explained that optimal compensation is equiv-
alent to the hypothetical value of the landowner’s property had she invested efficiently.
This amount of compensation is, given that a taking occurs, generally less than the
social benefit of the taking. Consequently, if the government is sufficiently wealth con-
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strained, the first best may only be attained if the government is non-benevolent. To
understand the intuition behind this puzzling conclusion, it is eye-opening to draw a
connection between our work and Blume et al. (1984). They demonstrate that if the
government can commit to initiate a taking whenever the social benefit of the taking is
higher than the hypothetical value of the landowner’s property had he or she invested
efficiently, any lump sum compensation plan induces the landowner to invest according
to the first best. If the government is non-benevolent, as in our model, it must, however,
not be able to commit. At the point where it decides whether to take the property or
not, it compares the social benefit of the taking to the amount of compensation it has
to pay. Consequently, if compensation is equivalent to the hypothetical value of the
landowner’s property had he or she invested efficiently, the non-benevolent government
chooses out of its own interest the very same taking decision the benevolent government
would like to commit to.

I. Breach Remedies Inducing
Hybrid Investments
We show that parties in bilateral trade can rely on the default
common law breach remedy of ‘expectation damages’ to induce
simultaneously first-best relationship-specific investments of both
the selfish and the cooperative kind. This can be achieved by writ-
ing a contract that specifies a sufficiently high quality level. In
contrast, the result by Che and Chung (1999) that ‘reliance dam-
ages’ induce the first best in a setting of purely cooperative invest-
ments, does not generalize to the hybrid case. We also show that
if the quality specified in the contract is too low, ‘expectation dam-
ages’ do not necessarily induce the ex-post efficient trade decision
in the presence of cooperative investments.
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1. Introduction
A risk neutral buyer and seller contract for the future delivery of a good. Before
delivery can take place, the seller makes an investment which has no value to the
outside market but which decreases the seller’s cost of production and increases the
future value of the good to the buyer. That is, the investment is hybrid, combining
cooperative investments in the sense of Che and Chung (1999) with selfish investments
as traditionally analyzed in the literature (see e.g. Chung, 1991; Aghion, Dewatripont
and Rey, 1994; Edlin and Reichelstein 1996; Shavell, 1980, 1984; Rogerson, 1984).1
This type of investments are highly relevant. Consider the famous General Motors -
Fisher Body case, which deals with Fisher Body’s decision to build a plant adjacent to
General Motors. Such an arrangement offered benefits to both parties by lowering ship-
ping costs and improving supply reliability (see Che and Hausch, 1999). Or consider
the example of Marks & Spencer, which routinely organizes joint trips to trade shows
with its suppliers. The trips enhance mutual understanding and help both parties to
identify new products that they could develop cooperatively. By facilitating bilateral
communication, Marks & Spencer adds valuable items to its product line while lowering
the risk of costly reengineering of products for the suppliers (see Kumar, 1996).
In the absence of contractual protection, the parties negotiate the terms of trade
after investments are sunk and after the quality of the product is revealed. Unless the
investing party has all the bargaining power, that party can only internalize a fraction
of the investment benefit in such negotiations. Recognizing this potential for hold-up,
the seller invests less than is socially desirable (Williamson, 1979, 1985; Grout, 1984;
Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1988).
We develop a model where parties write a contract specifying a price for future
trade and the quality of the good to be traded. If breach occurs, where either the seller
fails to deliver or the buyer fails to accept the good, or the seller delivers a good of
inadequate quality, the breached-against party can ask for expectation damages at trial.
Under this commonly-applied legal remedy, the victim of breach receives a payment
that makes him as well off as performance would have. We show that, under this legal
1In their seminal paper, Che and Hausch (1999) also allow for hybrid investments and prove for a
special informational setting that, if investments are sufficiently cooperative, contracting becomes
irrelevant. In contrast, Che and Chung (1999), who deal with legal breach remedies, consider
a different informational set-up and only allow for purely cooperative investments. Cooperative
investments were first studied in an incomplete contract setting by MacLeod and Malcomson
(1993) and are also referred to as “cross investments” (e.g. Guriev, 2003) or “investments with
externalities” (e.g. No¨ldeke and Schmidt, 1995). Other articles that consider cooperative invest-
ments include e.g. Bernheim and Whinston (1998), Maskin and Moore (1999), De Fraja (1999),
Rosenkranz and Schmitz (1999) , Segal and Whinston (2002), and Roider (2004).
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regime, the contract induces first-best investment incentives and the efficient ex-post
breach decision when the parties set the quality required under the contract sufficiently
high.2 This result holds independent of whether parties can renegotiate. However,
if the quality specification is set at an intermediate level, investment incentives are
inefficient and the standard result (see e.g. Posner, 1977; Shavell, 1980; Kornhauser,
1986; Craswell, 1988) that expectation damages induce the ex-post efficient breach
decision can be shown to no longer hold. The result generalizes Edlin (1996) and
Stremitzer (2010) who had analyzed the expectation damages regime in a setting of
purely selfish and purely cooperative investments, respectively.3
What makes this result interesting is that another well known efficiency result for this
setting, due to Che and Chung (1999), cannot be generalized to the hybrid case. Che
and Chung (1999) assume that parties can write a contract in which they stipulate the
price of the good to be traded and an up-front payment. If breach occurs, under which
the buyer refuses to accept the good, the seller can ask for reliance damages, i.e., he is
reimbursed his non-recoverable investment expenses. Che and Chung (1999) show that
there exists a price for which the contract induces the first best if renegotiation is possi-
ble. Yet, the logic of the argument cannot be extended to the hybrid setting. Indeed, it
is always possible to construct examples where reliance damages induce overinvestment
regardless of price. Although the precise argument is more complicated, this negative
result is driven by the well known insight that reliance damages induce overinvestment
2Edlin (1996) also analyses ‘Cadillac contracts’ in the context of expectation damages but makes a
different point: He considers a setting where the seller makes selfish investments. In the absence
of a contract, there will be underinvestment due to the hold-up problem. If, however, the contract
stipulates the highest possible quality/quantity, and it is the buyer who breaches the contract, the
seller will overinvest. This is because he is fully insured and fails to take into account the states
of the world where it is inefficient to trade (This is a version of the ‘overreliance’ result by Shavell
(1984) who implictly assumes Cadillac contracts by modelling the trade decision as binary). To
solve this problem, Edlin (1996) proposes to set the price so low, that it will always be the investing
seller who breaches the contract. That makes him the residual claimant and provides him with
efficient investment incentives. Yet, in order to make the seller accept a contract with such a low
price, the buyer has to pay the seller a lump sum up front. By contrast, in our model, we are
concerned with hybrid investments and need not rely on any up-front payments.
3Che and Chung (1999) had argued that ‘expectation damages’ perform very badly in such a setting
inducing zero cooperative investments. Yet, as Stremitzer (2010) has shown this follows from their
implicit assumption that the contract stays silent in terms of required quality which will rarely
be the case. Indeed, even if the parties do not stipulate anything explicit as to quality in their
contract (express warranty), the court will do it for them by default, e.g. by requiring the good
to serve its ordinary purpose (implied warranty of merchantability, see Section 2-314 and 2-315 of
the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)). Taking this feature of real world contracting into account,
Stremitzer (2010) shows that ‘expectation damages’ will always induce positive levels of cooperative
investments and achieve the first best if parties choose a sufficiently high quality specification.
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if investments are purely selfish (Shavell, 1980; Rogerson, 1984). For this reason, it is
not surprising that overinvestment occurs when investment is sufficiently selfish.4
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 describes our model and Section
3 derives the socially optimal level of investment. We then show in Section 4, that
the argument by Che and Chung (1999) on the efficiency of reliance damages cannot
be extended to the hybrid case. Section 5 contains our main result that first-best
investment levels can be achieved under expectation damages if the quality required
under the contract is set sufficiently high. If not, investment incentives will be inefficient
and expectation damages may even fail to induce the efficient ex-post trade decision.
Section 6 concludes.
2. The model
Consider a buyer-seller relationship where risk-neutral parties potentially trade a good.
At date 0, the parties sign a contract (see Figure I.1). The contract specifies a fixed
price, p, which has to be paid by the buyer if the seller performs in accordance with
the contract and, in the case of expectation damages, a quality threshold, v¯. Moreover,
the parties can specify a lump sum transfer, t, to split the expected gains from trade.
At date 1, the seller makes a relation-specific investment, e ∈ R+0 , which stochastically
determines the buyer’s benefit from trade as well as the seller’s cost of production. At
date 2, both the buyer’s potential benefit from trade, v, and the seller’s potential cost
of performance, c, are drawn from the intervals [0, vh] and [cl, ch] by the conditional
distribution functions F (·|e) and G(·|e) respectively.At date 3, the parties play a breach
game in which it is decided whether trade occurs or not. When renegotiations are
possible, they are costless and can occur anytime between date 3 and date 4 when
parties have to make the final trade decision. The potential renegotiation surplus is
split at an exogenously given ratio with the seller receiving a share of α ∈ [0, 1]. As an
example, consider the case where an engineering firm develops a new motor for a car
manufacturer. In the first stage, the engineering firm invests in know-how and develops
a construction plan. The know-how may reduce the costs of production and/or increase
the quality of the motor. Once the construction plan is ready, the parties know the
costs and benefits associated with the motor. Only then do they decide whether the
motor shall be produced.
The informational requirements depend on the breach remedy the court applies. Un-
der reliance damages, the court must be able to verify the seller’s investment whereas,
4That is, if the effect of seller’s investment on the cost of production is sufficiently large relative to
the effect on the good’s quality.
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Figure I.1.: Timeline of the model.
under expectation damages, it must be able to verify the buyer’s valuation and the
seller’s variable costs. Note that this information is also sufficient to decide whether
the quality of the product is below or above a certain quality threshold. While in-
vestment may be private information, everything else is observable and verifiable to all
parties. Finally, the following technical assumptions apply throughout:
• Assumption I.1 F (·|·) and G(·|·) are twice continuously differentiable.
• Assumption I.2 Fe(·|e) < 0 and Fee(·|e) > 0 for all v ∈ (0, vh) and e ≥ 0.
• Assumption I.3 Ge(·|e) > 0 and Gee(·|e) < 0 for all c ∈ (cl, ch) and e ≥ 0.
• Assumption I.4 Fe(v|0) = −∞ and/or Ge(c|0) =∞
for all v ∈ (0, vh) and for all c ∈ (cl, ch).
• Assumption I.5 Fe(v|∞) = 0 for all v ∈ (0, vh) and Ge(c|∞) = 0 for all
c ∈ (cl, ch)
• Assumption I.6 Fv|c((v|c)|e) = Fv(v|e) and Gc|v((c|v)|e) = Gc(c|e) for
(c, v) ∈ R2.
Assumption I.2 implies that an increase in e moves the distribution to the right at
a decreasing rate in the sense that F (·|e′) first-order stochastically dominates F (·|e)
for any e′ > e. In the same way Assumption I.3 implies that an increase in e moves
the distribution to the left at a decreasing rate in the sense that G(·|e′) first-order
stochastically dominates G(·|e) for any e′ < e. Assumptions I.4 and I.5 ensure an
interior solution to the social welfare problem while Assumption I.6 implies that variable
costs, c, and the buyer’s valuation, v, are stochastically independent. To save notation
we assume that the highest possible benefit of the buyer is equal to the highest possible
realization of variable cost, vh = ch.
5
5This assumption is not crucial for our main results. If vh ≥ ch, a contract which specifies a
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3. Benchmark
We consider the socially optimal allocation as a benchmark. A social planner cares for
two things: First, he wants parties to trade whenever trade is efficient ex-post, v ≥ c.
Second, given the ex-post optimal trade decision, he wants the seller to choose the
investment level e∗ which maximizes the expected gains of trade:
e∗ ∈ arg max W (e) =
∫ ch
cl
∫ vh
c
(v − c)Fv(v|e) dv Gc(c|e) dc− e. (I.1)
Twice integrating by parts and differentiating, the efficient investment level, e∗, can be
characterized by the following first-order condition:
W ′ (e∗) =
∫ ch
cl
([1− F (c|e∗)] Ge(c|e∗)− Fe(c|e∗) G(c|e∗)) dc− 1 = 0. (I.2)
We assume that W(e) is strictly quasi-concave in e. This ensures that e∗ is unique and
well defined.
4. Reliance damages with renegotiations
Che and Chung (1999) show that, in a setting of purely cooperative investments, there
exists a price such that reliance damages induce the first best if renegotiation is possible.
On the other hand, Shavell (1980) and Rogerson (1984) show that reliance damages
perform poorly in an environment of selfish investments, inducing overreliance. These
two results lead us to the question of how reliance damages perform in a hybrid setting,
which contains aspects of both cooperative and selfish investments. We find that it is
not possible to extend the result by Che and Chung (1999) to the hybrid case. Indeed,
reliance damages may fail to induce the first best regardless of price.6
To show this, we analyze the game induced by a simple contract specifying price, p,
and some lump sum transfer, t, if that contract is governed by reliance damages (see
Figure I.2).7 Under reliance damages, the seller is reimbursed his reliance expenses
e if the buyer announces breach (A¯). If the buyer is willing to accept the good and
quality specification above the highest possible realization of quality induces the first best under
expectation damages. Reliance damages may lead to overinvestment regardless of price if the cost
decreasing effect of investment is sufficiently strong compared to the value increasing effect of
investment.
6Since Che and Chung (1999) have already shown that ‘reliance damages’ fail to induce the first best
in a setting of purely cooperative investments if renegotiation is not possible, we focus on the case
where renegotiation is possible.
7In Figure I.2, after the buyer decided whether to accept or not, the terms in the first line represent
the seller’s ex-post payoff whereas the buyer’s ex-post payoff is given in the second line.
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Figure I.2.: Subgame induced by RD if renegotiations are possible.
trade occurs, the seller and the buyer receive p− c and v− p, respectively.8 Moreover,
whenever the buyer’s decision is ex post inefficient, the parties renegotiate towards
the ex post efficient trade decision and split the potential renegotiation surplus with
the seller receiving a fixed share of α ∈ [0, 1].9 For example, if v > c, but the buyer
announces breach, the seller derives α[v − c]+ from renegotiations, where we shall
frequently use the notation [·]+ = max[·, 0]. Hence, the buyer will announce breach if
and only if
−e+ (1− α)[v − c]+ > v − p+ (1− α)[c− v]+ (I.3)
or equivalently if
v < vˆ ≡ min [p− e− c
α
+ c, vh]. (I.4)
So far the analysis is identical to Che and Chung (1999) except that cost of production
is deterministic in their setting while it is stochastic in ours. Let us now revisit the
intuition behind Che and Chung’s result that there always exists a price which induces
first-best investment in a setting of purely cooperative investments. First, note that
the seller’s expected payoff decreases in e, conditional on the buyer accepting the good.
Since the buyer will never breach if price is set sufficiently low the parties can implement
zero investment by specifying p = 0. A very high price, on the other hand, ensures
8In order to stay close to the setting studied by Che and Chung (1999), we take over their assumption
that the buyer can legally compel the seller to deliver.
9Note that the bargaining set-up considered in Che and Chung (1999) differs from Rogerson (1984)
who implicitly assumes that parties can only renegotiate prior to the buyer’s breach decision. Also
Lyon and Rasmusen (2004) and Watson (2007) consider alternative bargaining models.
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that the buyer always announces breach. Given the reliance damages remedy, the seller
is sure to regain his investment and, in addition, to receive a renegotiation surplus of
α[v − c]+, which is increasing in e. Anticipating this, the seller invests as much as
he can, overinvesting relative to the efficient level.10 Hence, given that investment
depends continuously on price, there must exist an intermediate price that induces
first-best investment.
However, this simple intuition fails in a setting of hybrid investments. To see this,
first consider the case where the parties specify a very high price. Again, the seller
overinvests because his payoff α[v− c]+ + e− e is strictly increasing in e. Yet, even for
p = 0, the seller may have an incentive to overinvest. If investment is hybrid, his cost
of production is decreasing in e. We can prove the following proposition:
Proposition I.1: If parties can only stipulate a price, p, and a lump sum payment, t,
and their contract is governed by reliance damages, a price inducing first-best hybrid
investments does not always exist. Moreover, compared to p = 0 a positive price induces
weakly stronger incentives to invest.
Proof. To prove Proposition I.1, it is sufficient to construct an example where
the seller overinvests regardless of price. Here, we consider the simple case where the
seller’s bargaining power is very small, α −→ 0.11 The proof comes in three steps.
(i) We derive the investment level that maximizes the seller’s expected payoff. (ii)
Let eRD be the investment level that maximizes the seller’s expected payoff for p = 0.
We can then derive a condition for which eRD is higher than the social optimal level,
e∗. (iii) We show that the seller never invests less than eRD if the contract specifies a
positive price. If the condition that is given in the second part of the proof holds, it
then directly follows that the seller overinvests regardless of price.
(i) Anticipating the buyer’s decision at date 3, the seller, at date 1, expects to receive
the following payoff:
URD(e) =
∫ ch
cl
∫ vˆ
0
(e+ α[v − c]+)Fv(v|e) dv Gc(c|e) dc (I.5)
+
∫ ch
cl
∫ vh
vˆ
(p− c+ α[c− v]+)Fv(v|e) dv Gc(c|e) dc− e.
We assume that URD(e) is strictly quasi-concave in e for all p to ensure that there exists
a unique equilibrium investment level. Let v˜ ≡ p−e−ch
α
+ ch and cˆ ≡ p−e−αvh1−α where cˆ is
10Technically speaking, the seller’s investment would be arbitrarily close to infinity since Che and
Chung (1999) do not impose any wealth constraint but assume e ∈ R+0 .
11It is not necessary that the seller’s bargaining power is marginal, as in our example, to prove that
overreliance can occur. However this example allows for a relatively simple intuition compared to
cases of larger bargaining powers.
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defined such that c ≤ cˆ implies vˆ = vh and c ≥ cˆ implies vˆ = p−e−cα + c (see expression
I.4). Twice integrating by parts and reorganizing we can rewrite (I.5) as follows:12
URD(e) = p− e− ch − α
∫ v˜
ch
F (v|e) +
∫ ch
cl
G(c|e) dc (I.6)
− α
∫ ch
cl
F (c|e)G(c|e) dc− (1− α)
∫ ch
cˆ
F (vˆ|e)G(c|e) dc
− (1− α)
∫ cˆ
cl
G(c|e) dc.
Hence, the investment level eRD that maximizes the seller’s expected payoff is given by
the following first-order condition:
U ′RDe (e
RD) = F (v˜|eRD)− α
∫ v˜
ch
Fe(v|eRD) dv +
∫ ch
cl
Ge(c|eRD) dc (I.7)
− α
∫ ch
cl
[Fe(c|eRD)G(c|eRD) + F (c|eRD)Ge(c|eRD)] dc
− (1− α)
∫ ch
cˆ
[Fe(vˆ|eRD)− 1
α
Fv(vˆ|eRD)] G(c|eRD) dc
− (1− α)
∫ ch
cˆ
F (vˆ|eRD)Ge(c|eRD) dc+ [1− F (vˆ|eRD)]G(cˆ|eRD)
− (1− α)
∫ cˆ
cl
Ge(c|eRD) dc− 1 = 0.
(ii) To show that overinvestment relative to the socially optimal level can arise for
p = 0, consider the case where the seller’s bargaining power is very small, α −→ 0.
Inserting p = 0 into (I.7) yields:
U ′RDe (e
RD) = α
∫ ch
v˜
Fe(v|eRD) dv +
∫ ch
cl
Ge(c|eRD) dc (I.8)
− α
∫ ch
cl
[Fe(c|eRD)G(c|eRD) + F (c|eRD)Ge(c|eRD)] dc− 1 = 0
and the limit as α goes to zero is given by:
lim
α→0
U ′RD(eRD) =
∫ ch
cl
Ge(c|eRD) dc− 1 = 0.
It is clear that eRD > e∗ if the first derivative of the expected social welfare function
(I.2) evaluated at eRD is negative:13
W ′(eRD) =
∫ ch
cl
([1− F (c|eRD)]Ge(c|eRD)− Fe(c|eRD)G(c|eRD)) dc− 1 < 0 (I.9)
⇐⇒+
∫ ch
cl
[−F (c|eRD)Ge(c|eRD)− Fe(c|eRD)G(c|eRD)] dc < 0.
12See Appendix A.1.1 for omitted intermediate steps.
13Strict quasi-concavity of W(e) in e ensures that W(e) is single peaked and therefore W ′(eRD) < 0
implies eRD > e∗.
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This is indeed the case for those parameter constellations where the first negative term
in the second line of (I.9) is larger in absolute value than the second, positive, term
or where the selfish effect of investment is strong relative to the cooperative effect,
Ge(c|eRD) >> −Fe(c|eRD).
(iii) In Appendix A.1.1 we show that the seller invests at least eRD if a positive price
has been specified in the contract.
Even though the proof of Proposition I.1 is rather tedious, the intuition behind it is
straightforward. We can see from Figure I.2 that if parties set the price very low, say
at p = 0, the buyer always accepts delivery and, as in Che and Chung (1999), compels
the seller to deliver. Thus the seller’s payoff is p − c for v ≥ c and p − (1− α) c − αv
for v < c. Hence, his payoff always increases as cost becomes lower, while a benevolent
social planner disregards the cost-decreasing effect of investment for v < c. It may thus
occur that the seller overinvests at price p = 0. This is especially likely if the seller’s
bargaining power α is low and investment mainly affects cost and only has marginal
influence on quality. Given this possibility, it suffices to show that a positive price will
never induce the seller to invest less. This is true, as increasing the price only makes it
more likely that the buyer announces breach.14 Yet, the seller’s payoff in case of breach
α[v− c]+ + e− e is increasing in e. If the buyer always breached investment incentives
would even be indefinitely high. Therefore, investment incentives rise in p.
Hence, the efficiency result derived by Che and Chung (1999) for reliance damages
in a setting of purely cooperative investments does not generalize to the hybrid case.
However, we will show in the next section that such a generalization is possible for the
efficiency result derived for the expectation damages remedy in Stremitzer (2010).
5. Expectation damages
5.1. Expectation damages without renegotiations
In contrast to the case of reliance damages, where it is impossible to achieve ex-post
efficiency if renegotiation is ruled out, a standard result of the law and economics
literature suggests that the expectation damages remedy induces the ex-post efficient
trade decision (see e.g. Posner, 1977; Shavell, 1980; Kornhauser; Craswell, 1988).
Hence, it may be possible to derive an efficiency result even without renegotiation.
As mentioned, we assume that the parties write a contract stipulating a fixed price, p,
payable by the buyer upon the seller’s performance and a quality level v¯ which specifies
the required quality level under the contract and serves as a baseline for calculating
14If the price is smaller than (1−α)cl, the buyer still always accepts delivery. Then the seller invests
the same amount as if a p = 0 had been specified in contract.
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Figure I.3.: Subgame induced by expectation damages.
damages if the seller delivers a non-conforming good.15 For example, the contract could
specify that a motor should not exceed a certain level of fuel consumption. Moreover,
the parties can specify a lump sum transfer, t, to split the expected gains from trade
(an instrument which we shall show they will not need in order to achieve the first
best).
Assuming the buyer never refuses delivery,16 the seller faces the following decision:
If he decides to deliver the good, he receives the trade price but has to incur the costs
of production and therefore receives a trade surplus of p − c (see Figure I.3). Under
expectation damages, the victim of breach receives a payment that makes him as well
off as performance would have. It thus follows that if the good is of inferior quality,
v < v¯, the seller has to pay damages amounting to v¯−v. If the seller refuses to deliver,
and assuming v¯ ≥ p,17 the buyer receives his contractually assured trade surplus of
v¯ − p regardless of the good’s quality.
We will now solve the game by backwards induction. If v < v¯, the seller will deliver
if and only if it is ex-post efficient to do so (p− c− (v¯ − v) ≥ −(v¯ − p) ⇐⇒ v ≥ c).
However, if the buyer’s valuation turns out to be above the threshold, v ≥ v¯, the seller
will deliver if and only if p− c ≥ −(v¯− p), or equivalently c ≤ v¯. Hence, for v¯ < c < v,
15As is commonly assumed if courts apply expectation damages, the court can perfectly observe the
buyers benefit from trade or at least is able to form an unbiased estimate of it.
16We show in Appendix A.1.2 that this simplifying assumption does not change the analysis of this
and the following subsection.
17Note that v¯ < p would imply that the seller does not have to pay any damages if he decides not to
deliver. One can readily show that it is indeed optimal for the parties to make sure that the price
is lower than promised quality.
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the seller’s trade decision is ex-post inefficient. We can therefore write the following
proposition:
Proposition I.2: If parties specify a threshold below the highest possible realization of
quality, v¯ < vh, expectation damages fail to generally induce ex-post efficient trade.
This result is surprising as expectation damages are commonly seen to induce the
ex-post efficient breach decision. Given the seller’s decision at date 3, he expects the
following payoff at date 1:
UED(e) =
∫ v¯
cl
∫ vh
v¯
(p− c) Fv(v|e) dv Gc(c|e) dc (I.10)
+
∫ v¯
cl
∫ v¯
c
[(p− c)− (v¯ − v)] Fv(v|e) dv Gc(c|e) dc
+
∫ v¯
cl
∫ c
0
−(v¯ − p) Fv(v|e) dv Gc(c|e) dc
+
∫ ch
v¯
∫ vh
0
−(v¯ − p) Fv(v|e) dv Gc(c|e) dc− e.
Integrating by parts and reorganizing allows us to simplify (I.10):
UED(e) = p− v¯ − e+
∫ v¯
cl
[1− F (c|e)]G(c|e) dc. (I.11)
The seller’s optimal investment level, eED, can then be characterized by the following
first-order condition:
U ′ED(eED) =
∫ v¯
cl
([1− F (c|eED)] Ge(c|eED)− Fe(c|eED) G(c|eED)) dc− 1 = 0. (I.12)
We can derive the following proposition:
Proposition I.3: If renegotiation is impossible and parties specify a sufficiently high
quality threshold, v¯ ≥ vh, expectation damages induce the first best.
Proof. If v¯ ≥ vh = ch, we know from Proposition I.2 that the seller’s breach decision
is ex-post efficient. Comparing expression (I.12) with the benchmark condition (I.2) we
also see that v¯ ≥ vh = ch ensures that the seller chooses the socially optimal investment
level.
The intuition behind Proposition I.3 is that the seller is made a residual claimant.
If v¯ ≥ ch, he receives the entire trade surplus minus a constant term, (v¯ − p). He will
therefore have incentives to invest at the socially optimal level. As the high quality
threshold also induces the ex-post efficient trade decision the contract achieves the first
best.18
18If we relax our simplifying assumption by assuming vh ≥ ch, one can readily show that a contract
that specifies a sufficiently high quality threshold, v¯ ≥ vh, still induces the first best. However,
the delivery decision can also be efficient outside the first best. This is for example the case if
vh > v¯ ≥ ch.
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Our result can be contrasted to a related result by Edlin (1996) who analyzes the
efficiency of expectation damages if investment is purely selfish. In the case of a seller,
who invests in order to lower his variable cost of performance, he finds that a contract
which specifies the highest possible quantity (a so-called ”Cadillac contract”) will make
the seller a residual claimant if the contract price is set low enough that it will always
be the investing seller who breaches the contract. In order to make the seller accept
such a low price, the contract also specifies up-front lump sum payment from the buyer
to the seller.19
Our result differs in two respects. First, we are concerned with inducing hybrid
investments as opposed to purely selfish investments. In other words, the seller’s in-
vestment not only serves to lower the seller’s variable cost of delivery but stochastically
determines both the seller’s cost and the good’s quality (and therefore the buyer’s val-
uation for the good).20 While efficient purely selfish investments, in our setting, could
be achieved through a contract that specifies the highest possible quantity (one unit in
a binary setting) but is silent about quality, parties need to specify the highest possible
quantity and the highest possible quality level in order to achieve first best hybrid
investments. This is because the value increasing effect of investment can only be in-
ternalized through the seller’s expected damage payments which arise when quality is
non-conforming to the contract. The second major difference to Edlin (1996) is that
we do not rely on up-front payments as, in equilibrium, our bilateral breach game leads
to the same payoff profile for the investing party as if we assumed that only the seller
breached the contract. Parties can therefore use the contract price as an instrument to
divide the expected gains from trade.
Finally, note that our first-best result holds even if the seller’s expected payoff func-
tion, UED(e), is not strictly quasi-concave in e for all v¯. To derive results outside
the first best, we have to impose stronger assumptions on the seller’s expected payoff
function. We prove the following lemma:
19Already Shavell (1984) had recognized that expectation damages induce the first best if the in-
vesting party is the breaching party. Actually, the results are structurally the same, as Shavell
(1984) implictly assumes that the contract specifies the highest possible quantity by modelling the
trade decision as binary (a contract requiring delivery then automatically specifies the ”highest”
possible quantity). Shavell (1984) did not, however, describe how up-front payments can be used
to contractually manipulate the identity of the breaching party.
20Edlin also offers an interpretation of his model, where a Cadillac contract would mean that parties
stipulate the highest possible quality. Yet, in his model, delivering high or low quality is a choice
variable of the seller just as delivering high or low quantity. In our setting, quality is stochastically
determined by the cooperative component of the seller’s ex-ante investment.
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Lemma I.1: (i) If the contract specifies a low quality level, v¯ < ch, and U
ED is strictly
quasi-concave in e for all v¯, the seller underinvests. (ii) If UED is strictly concave in
e for all v¯, investment incentives rise in the level of required quality.
Proof. (i) To see that underinvestment will be the norm recall that U ′ED(e∗) = 0
if v¯ = ch. Fixing e = e
∗, we consider U ′ED(·) as a function of v¯. The seller has
lower investment incentives relative to the socially optimal level if U ′ED(v¯) < 0 for all
v¯ < ch.
21 This is true because, for all v¯ < ch
U ′ED(v¯) =
∫ v¯
cl
([1− F (c|e∗)] Ge(c|e∗)− Fe(c|e∗) G(c|e∗)) dc− 1 (I.13)
=
∫ ch
cl
([1− F (c|e∗)] Ge(c|e∗)− Fe(c|e∗) G(c|e∗)) dc− 1
−
∫ ch
v¯
([1− F (c|e∗)] Ge(c|e∗)− Fe(c|e∗) G(c|e∗)) dc < 0.
Note that the term in the second line of (I.13) is equal to zero whereas the term in the
third line must be negative by Assumptions I.2 and I.3.
(ii) If UED(e) is strictly concave in e for all v¯, investment incentives rise in the level
of required quality. To see this note that investment incentives rise in the threshold if
deED
dv¯
> 0. Implicitly differentiating (I.12) and rearranging, we have:
deED
dv¯
= − {[1− F (v¯|e
ED)]Ge(v¯|eED)− Fe(v¯|eED)G(v¯|eED)} dc∫ v¯
cl
{[1− F (c|e)]Gee(c|e)− Fee(c|e)G(c|e)− 2Fe(c|e)Ge(c|e)} dc
. (I.14)
The numerator of (I.14) must be positive due to Assumptions I.2 and I.3. Strict con-
cavity implies that the denominator of (I.14) must be negative because it is equivalent
to U ′′ED. Hence we can conclude that de
ED
dv¯
> 0.
Intuitively, underinvestment occurs for two reasons: If the product is conforming to
the contract, v ≥ v¯, and the seller decides to deliver he receives p− c. If v > c > v¯, the
seller refuses to deliver and pays damages of − (v¯ − p) even though it would be socially
optimal to trade. In both cases, he does not take into account the value-increasing
effect of his investment. Since both sources of inefficiency diminish as v¯ approaches
vh, investment incentives increase in the threshold value v¯. The result extends the
proof of Stremitzer (2010) that it is possible to implement the efficient outcome with
expectation damages in a setting of purely cooperative investment to the hybrid case.
21Strict quasi-concavity of UED in e for all v¯ ensures that UED is single peaked and hence the following
argument is valid. Note that strict quasi-concavity is a common assumption to ensure a unique
equilibrium level.
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Figure I.4.: Subgame induced by expectation damages if renegotiation is possible.
5.2. Expectation damages with renegotiation
When renegotiation is possible, the parties use the payoff they would receive in the
absence of renegotiation as a threat point. Consequently, the payoffs in Figure I.3
must be adjusted to take into account the effect of renegotiation (see Figure I.4).22
Recall from Proposition I.2 that an optimal contract governed by expectation damages,
v¯ ≥ vh = ch, induces an efficient ex-post delivery decision. Proposition I.4 directly
follows:
Proposition I.4: If renegotiations are possible and parties specify a sufficiently high
quality threshold, v¯ ≥ vh, expectation damages induce the first best.
The intuition behind Proposition I.4 is that an efficient ex-post delivery decision
renders renegotiations worthless. Hence, payoffs in equilibrium are the same as in the
no-renegotiation case and the investment incentives coincide.
6. Conclusion
It is reassuring that expectation damages, the default remedy of common law, not only
performs well in a setting of purely cooperative investments but also in the hybrid
case. Indeed, the same Cadillac contract which achieves the first best in the purely
cooperative setting also achieves the first best in the hybrid case. Under reliance dam-
ages, on the other hand, parties must fine-tune the contract price, stipulate up-front
payments, and rely on renegotiation to achieve the first best. Even then, they cannot
22Note that we assume that p ≤ v¯ which allows us to simplify payoffs.
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achieve the first best when investments are sufficiently selfish. Our analysis therefore
suggests that parties should think twice before opting out of default expectation dam-
ages for privately stipulated reliance damages, in contrast to the recommendation of
Che and Chung (1999). A more troubling result regarding expectation damages is that
efficient ex post trade is only guaranteed if parties set the quality threshold sufficiently
high. Otherwise - as under reliance damages and specific performance - there are states
of the world where parties must rely on renegotiation to achieve the ex-post efficient
allocation.
So far, the literature on the incentive effects of different breach remedies has mainly
focused on comparing the efficiency of different remedies such as expectation damages,
reliance damages or specific performance in varying environments. Yet, even though
these settings are usually quite specific, parts of the literature make broader claims to
the effect that a certain breach remedy performs well/poorly in general. For instance,
Plambeck and Taylor (2007) state that the specific performance remedy is more efficient
than expectation damages for inducing optimal relationship-specific investment. They
consider a model where N buyers make a selfish investment (innovation) whereas the
seller invests to increase capacity such that he or she can supply higher quantities to the
buyers after the outcome of the innovation is realized. Since their model is essentially
building on Edlin and Reichelstein’s (1996) model of bilateral selfish investment they
find, like Edlin and Reichelstein, that expectation damages perform poorly in a setting
of bilateral selfish investment. However, as Ohlendorf (2009) has pointed out, expecta-
tion damages induce efficient bilateral investment if the cost function is not linear, as in
Edlin and Reichelstein (1996), but sufficiently concave.23 This, together with our result
on hybrid investments, suggests that properly specified expectation damages perform
well in close to any situation given that sufficient information is available to assess
them. The main role for alternative regimes such as specific performance or reliance
damages therefore is to offer alternative solutions for situations where informational
constraints render them easier to assess than expectation damages.
Finally, our analysis illustrates a subtle difference between mechanism design and
the economic analysis of real world institutions. As we have already mentioned, the
enforcement of reliance damages requires investment to be verifiable. Then, however,
parties should theoretically be able to achieve the first best by writing a forcing contract
in which they stipulate the efficient investment level. Yet, we show that this does not
necessarily imply that reliance damages induce the first best. Indeed, the issue is not
23Plambeck and Taylor (2007) actually find that the first best is attainable under bilateral expectation
damages if the parties can affect their ex-post bargaining power through renegotiation design.
However Ohlendorf’s (2009) finding suggests that renegotiation design is not necessary to induce
efficient bilateral investment under expectation damages.
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whether the information required to operate an institution is in theory sufficient to
achieve the first best. It is about how institutions make use of that information.24
24Both Che and Chung (1999) and Schweizer (2006) prove interesting results, although, by requiring
investment to be verifiable, their insights are not surprising from the perspective of contract theory.

II. Expectation Damages and
Bilateral Cooperative
Investments
We examine the efficiency of the standard breach remedy expec-
tation damages in a setting of bilateral cooperative investment by
a buyer and a seller. Contracts may specify a required quality
level and an upper bound to the cost of production. We find that
it is optimal to write an augmented Cadillac contract that sets
one threshold such that it cannot be met with positive probability
together with an extreme price. Then, one of the parties becomes
a residual claimant of the trade relationship. The other threshold
can be used to balance the incentives of the other party.
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1. Introduction
In this chapter, we consider a situation where a buyer and a seller, both risk neutral,
contract for the future delivery of a good. Between the signing of the contract and
production of the good both parties may invest cooperatively to stochastically increase
the benefit of their trading partner. After uncertainty is resolved and investments
are sunk but before trade is finalized, the parties may renegotiate to reach an ex-
post optimal trade decision. Contracts are important to solve the standard hold-up
problem that results in underinvestment and arises if trading parties solely rely on
ex-post negotiations to induce investment incentives (see e.g. Williamson, 1985; Hart
and Moore, 1988).
The earlier literature on the economic analysis of contract law has extensively dealt
with and offered solutions for the unilateral investment problem. For selfish invest-
ment, Edlin (1996) demonstrates that the classic overreliance result for the standard
breach remedy of expectation damages (see e.g. Shavell, 1980, 1984 ; Rogerson, 1984)
vanishes if the parties write a so-called Cadillac contract that specifies the highest pos-
sible quantity and/or quality combined with a sufficiently low price.1 The idea behind
this commonly-applied legal remedy is that the victim of breach receives a payment
that makes him or her as well off as performance would have. In a setting of cooper-
ative investment, Stremitzer (2010) confirms the optimality of Cadillac contracts. In
contrast to selfish investment, an optimal Cadillac contract specifies, in his setting,
the highest possible quantity and quality.2 There only exist few results for bilateral
investment. Edlin and Reichelstein (1996) analyze selfish investment and consider con-
tracts that specify price and a quantity to be traded. Their main finding is that if the
trade decision is continuous the socially optimal solution can be attained under the
specific performance remedy whereas expectation damages perform poorly. Ohlendorf
(2009), however, points out that the poor performance of expectation damages can be
attributed to Edlin and Reichelstein’s (1996) assumption of a deterministic and lin-
ear cost function: If it is sufficiently concave, expectation damages can indeed induce
the first best in Edlin and Reichelstein’s (1996) setting. So far, the literature on the
economic analysis of contract law has not dealt with bilateral cooperative investment.
1An alternative solution is offered by Edlin and Reichelstein (1996) who find that expectation dam-
ages and another standard breach remedy, specific performance, can induce the first best if quantity
is continuous and can therefore be used as an instrument to balance the overinvestment effect of
Shavell (1980) against the hold-up effect that arises in absence of contractual protection.
2Several alternative solutions to the cooperative investment problem have been proposed in the
literature. For example, Che and Chung (1999) and Schweizer (2006) allow the parties to specify
a required investment level. They show that the first best can be attained by a contract that is
governed by reliance damages and expectation damages, respectively.
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This may be due to Che and Hausch’s (1999) pessimistic view about the value of con-
tracting in such an environment. Under the strict assumption that courts are not able
to verify any direct or indirect signal about investment and the state of the world, they
demonstrate that contracting becomes irrelevant if investment is of a sufficiently co-
operative nature. Even though the economic analysis of contract law generally makes
less strict assumptions, Che and Hausch’s (1999) result suggests that it may be diffi-
cult to balance both parties’ investment incentives in a setting of purely cooperative
investment. Bilateral cooperative investment is, however, highly relevant in practise.
Consider, for example, a situation where a manufacturer with a fixed train of machines
invests to custom tailor the product to the wishes of his buyer. The buyer, in turn,
may exert effort to improve coordination between both parties. Dyer and Ouchi (1993)
mention Japanese automakers that sent consultants to their suppliers to help decrease
cost of production.
The aim of this chapter is twofold. First, we demonstrate that the bilateral holdup
problem that often arises under cooperative investment can be solved by a combination
between a Cadillac and a balancing contract, henceforth augmented Cadillac contract.
To obtain this result, we do not impose stronger informational requirements on courts
than in Edlin and Reichelstein (1996). All that is needed is that the court is able to
unbiasedly estimate the buyer’s benefit from trade and the seller’s cost of production.
Second, we do so using a generally applicable machinery that does not require differen-
tiability. The contracts we consider are governed by expectation damages. They may
specify, besides price and quantity, a required quality level that serves as a baseline for
calculating damages if the seller delivers one or more goods of non-conforming quality.
Similarly, the contracting parties may stipulate an upper bound for the seller’s cost of
production such that all cost above this threshold are born by the buyer. A standard
Cadillac contract specifies a single threshold and sets it at an extreme level such that
it cannot be met with positive probability. Together with either a very low or a very
high price this ensures that one of the parties accepts/delivers the quantity specified
in contract whereas the other party breaches to the socially efficient quantity. Conse-
quently, the breaching party is a residual claimant of the trade relationship and thus
has efficient incentives to invest. What is crucial here is that the parties may freely
specify a second threshold without disturbing the incentives of the residual claimant.
Thus, it can be used to balance the incentives of the non-breaching party. Our result
challenges the viewpoint expressed in Edlin (1996) and Edlin and Reichelstein (1996)
that expectation damages are poorly suited to solve problems of bilateral investment.
Moreover, in contrast to Ohlendorf (2009), this chapter also suggests that it may not
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be necessary that both parties face the risk of ex-post breach.3
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model before we discuss
the legal consequences of breach in section 3. In Sections 4, 5 and 6, we consider binary
trade. Section 4 assumes that the buyer takes the performance decision whereas the
seller takes it in Section 5. We demonstrate that in both cases a standard Cadillac
contract can be augmented such that the first best is induced. Section 6 considers the
ex-post breach game induced by expectation damages. We show that the first-best
contracts of Sections 4 and 5 induce the parties to behave as if the buyer or as if
the seller takes the performance decision, respectively. In Section 7, we extend, under
the assumption that contracts are divisible, our first best result to non-binary trade.
Section 8 concludes.
3If, similar to the literature, both parties make a purely selfish investment, one can readily show
that the first best can be achieved by a contract that specifies an extreme price together with
an intermediate cost or quality threshold. Similar to a standard Cadillac contract, this contract
determines the breaching party. The result is available upon request.
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The parties sign                Investments are chosen          State of the world               Breach decisions           Production and trade 
a contract                                                                           is realized                                                                 or legal dispute
Possible RenegotiationFigure 1: Timeline of the model.
Figure II.1.: Timeline of the model.
2. The model
Consider a situation where a buyer and a seller, both risk neutral, have to incur
relationship-specific investments before they potentially trade a quantity q of some
good. At date 1, the parties sign a contract to induce an efficient outcome (see Figure
II.1). The contract, which is governed by expectation damages, specifies a fixed price
p and a quantity q¯ to be traded. Furthermore, it may stipulate an upper bound for the
seller’s cost of production c¯, a required quality v¯ and an upfront transfer t, where the
latter is used to divide the expected gains from trade after price and thresholds have
been chosen to maximize joint surplus. The legal implications of this type of contract
are discussed in Section 3. At date 2, the buyer invests to decrease the seller’s expected
cost of production whereas the seller invests to increase the buyer’s expected benefit
from trade. We denote the cost of their investments by β ∈ [0, βmax] and σ ∈ [0, σmax],
respectively, and assume that the investment decisions are not contractible. Then, at
date 3, the state of the world ω ∈ Ω is realized and hence the potential level of the
seller’s cost of production and the buyer’s benefit from trade become commonly known.
At date 4, the parties play an extensive form breach game, which is described in
detail in Section 3 and results in a quantity q ∈ Q to be traded at date 5. In Sections 3
to 6 the trade choice is binary. W.l.o.g., we consider Q = {0, 1}. If it is non-binary, as
in Section 7, we consider Q = {0, 1, 2, ..., qmax}. The payoffs determined by expectation
damages serve as a disagreement point in subsequent renegotiations, which are costless
and can take place anywhere between date 4 and date 5. The parties split the potential
renegotiation surplus at an exogenously given ratio with the seller receiving a share of
α ∈ [0, 1].4 Let us denote the seller’s cost of producing q units by C(β, ω, q) and the
buyer’s benefit of obtaining q units by V (σ, ω, q). To identify cost and and benefit
associated with each single unit, we denote them, for the ith unit, by Ci(β, ω) and
Vi(σ, ω), respectively. Let us assume that they are additive separable: For any unit
4This is, for example, the case if the parties play a bargaining game that results in the generalized
Nash bargaining solution.
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i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}, the seller’s cost of production and the buyer’s benefit do not depend
on whether the remaining units are produced or not. Finally, the following technical
assumptions apply throughout:
Assumption II.1 For any β ∈ [0, βmax], σ ∈ [0, σmax] and ω ∈ Ω, C(β, ω, q) and
V (σ, ω, q) are monotonically increasing in q and C(β, ω, 0) = V (σ, ω, 0) = 0.
Assumption II.2 For any ω ∈ Ω and q > 0, V (σ, ω, q) is monotonically increas-
ing in σ and C(β, ω, q) is monotonically decreasing in β.
Assumption II.3 There exist cl and ch s.t. for any unit i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N} and for
all β ∈ [0, βmax] and ω ∈ Ω, 0 ≤ cl ≤ Ci(β, ω) ≤ ch < ∞. Moreover, there exist
vl and vh s.t. for any unit i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N} and for all σ ∈ [0, σmax] and ω ∈ Ω,
0 ≤ vl ≤ Vi(σ, ω) ≤ vh <∞.
Assumption II.1 establishes that, ex-post, the total cost of production and the buyer’s
benefit are increasing in the quantity to be traded. Assumption II.2 represents that
investment is beneficial and of a purely cooperative nature. It directly follows that the
expected value of the buyer’s benefit and of the seller’s cost is increasing in the other
parties’ investment. Assumption II.3 establishes that for any unit to be potentially
traded the cost of production and the buyer’s benefit lie within a bounded interval.
The ex-post social surplus of the transaction,
W (β, σ, ω, q) = V (σ, ω, q)− C(β, ω, q),
is maximized at the socially efficient quantity
Q∗(β, σ, ω) ∈ arg max
q∈[0,qmax]
W (β, σ, ω, q).
The efficient investment levels, denoted by (β∗, σ∗), maximize the expected welfare
gains from trade
E[W (β, σ, ω,Q∗(β, σ, ω))]− β − σ
in [0, βmax] × [0, σmax] contingent on an efficient trade decision. We assume that β∗
and σ∗ are unique maximizers.5
5This assumption is not required to establish any of our results. It makes, however, the proofs
considerably less tedious.
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Figure II.2.: Breachgame induced by expectation damages.
3. Ex-post payoff
In this section, we work out the parties’ ex-post payoffs induced by expectation dam-
ages when the buyer’s benefit and the seller’s cost of production are observable by
the contracting parties and the court. For clarity of exposition, we first tackle the
case where trade is binary, Q ≡ {0, 1}.6 To simplify notation, let us denote cost of
production and quality of the good by c := C(β, ω, 1) and v := V (σ, ω, 1), respectively.7
In absence of breach, the buyer has to pay the contracted price and receives the
good whereas the seller receives the price but has to incur production costs. These
payoffs are given by v− p and p− c, respectively. The idea of the expectation damage
rule is that the victim of breach has to be compensated such that he or she is in as
good a position as if the contract had been fulfilled. This rule is, however, not applied
literally if breach is advantageous for the breached-against party. In that case damage
payments are zero.
As mentioned, we assume that the parties may stipulate a required quality level v¯.
This quality threshold serves as a baseline for calculating damages if the seller delivers a
non-conforming good. Suppose that the seller announces his delivery decision followed
by the buyer’s announcement of whether she accepts the good (see Figure II.2).8 If
the seller delivers a non-conforming good and the buyer accepts, the buyer may claim
6Alternatively, we consider non-binary trade in Section 7.
7For simplicity, we do not distinguish between the buyer’s benefit from trade and the quality of the
good. For our results to go through it is only required that the court’s perception of quality is an
unbiased estimate of the buyer’s true benefit from trade. See Edlin (1996) for a detailed discussion
of imperfectly informed courts.
8The order of announcements does not affect any of our results.
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compensation amounting to v¯ − v. Similarly, the parties may specify a cost threshold
c¯ which is defined such that any additional cost above c¯ are borne by the buyer. Thus,
the contract guarantees v¯ − p to the buyer and p− c¯ to the seller.
If the seller delivers (D) and the buyer accepts (A), the latter’s ex-post payoff amounts
to
BD,A(β, σ, ω, q) = max[v, v¯]− p− max[c− c¯, 0] + (1− α) max[c− v, 0] (II.1)
where (1−α)max[c−v, 0] represents the Buyer’s potential bargaining surplus. Likewise,
the Seller’s ex-post payoff corresponds to
SD,A(β, σ, ω, q) = p− min[c, c¯]− max[v¯ − v, 0] + α max[c− v, 0]. (II.2)
Suppose that the seller announces to deliver (D) but the buyer refuses to accept (A¯).
If the good is conforming to the contract v ≥ v¯, the seller receives, as compensation,
his contractually ensured trade surplus p− c¯. However, if quality is inferior v < v¯, we
assume, as in Edlin (1996), that the parties have a broad duty to mitigate damages.
The buyer is obliged to accept performance whether the good is conforming to the
contract or not and may only collect max[v¯− v, 0] in damages. This prevents her from
threatening to reject performance unless the seller agrees to pay larger damages. If she
decides despite of her obligation to refuse performance, the seller may claim damages.
Total damages amount to the seller’s contractually guaranteed surplus p − c¯ minus
the damages he would have to pay to the buyer had she accepted.9 Consequently, the
buyer’s ex-post payoff amounts to
BD,A¯(β, σ, ω, q) = − max[p− c¯− max[v¯ − v, 0], 0] + (1− α) max[v − c, 0] (II.3)
whereas the seller receives
SD,A¯(β, σ, ω, q) = max[p− c¯− max[v¯ − v, 0], 0] + α max[v − c, 0]. (II.4)
If the seller refuses to deliver (D¯) the buyer may sue for damages (ED). Then, her
payoff is given by
BD¯,ED(β, σ, ω, q) = max[v¯ − p− max[c− c¯, 0], 0] + (1− α) max[v − c, 0] (II.5)
whereas the seller receives
SD¯,ED(β, σ, ω, q) = − max[v¯ − p− max[c− c¯, 0], 0] + α max[v − c, 0]. (II.6)
9If total damages were equivalent to the seller’s contractually assured trade surplus p− c¯, he would
be, in contrast to the aim of expectation damages, in a better position as if the contract had been
fulfilled. As mentioned, the buyer cannot sue for a reward if total damages are negative. The case
where the seller does not claim damages is equivalent to the one where total damages are zero. In
both situations, the parties’ ex-post payoff is identical to their respective bargaining shares.
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In contrast, suppose the buyer does not sue for damages (0). In that case, neither party
has to pay damages and both parties’ ex-post payoff
BD¯,0(β, σ, ω, q) = (1− α) max[v − c, 0] (II.7)
and
SD¯,0(β, σ, ω, q) = α max[v − c, 0] (II.8)
is identical to their respective bargaining shares.10
4. Buyer takes the performance decision
In this section, we assume that the buyer takes the performance decision, i.e. the
seller always announces to deliver.11 We find that it is optimal for the parties to write
an augmented Cadillac contract that combines aspects from Cadillac and balancing
contracts. Edlin (1996) defines a Cadillac contract as a contract that stipulates the
highest possible quantity and/or quality. A balancing contract, in contrast, sets the
contractual parameters at an intermediate level. For example, Chung (1991) and Edlin
and Reichelstein (1996) consider contracts where the parties stipulate an intermediate
quantity such that the investors sometimes receive more and sometimes less than the
marginal social return of their investment. The contracts we consider in this section
stipulate the lowest possible cost of production c¯ = cl, some intermediate quality
threshold v¯ ∈ [vl, vh], a high price p ≥ vh + max[cl − vl, 0] and that the good has
to be traded q¯ = 1. In Section 6, we consider the ex-post breach game induced by
expectation damages and demonstrate that the combination of a low cost threshold
and a high price induces the parties to behave as if the buyer takes the performance
decision.
In Lemma II.1, we show that the buyer performs whenever it is socially desirable to do
so. Thus, the efficient breach property of expectation damages continues to hold.12 This
property is desirable because it ensures that there is no scope for renegotiation. Given
10Note that the buyer’s decision is trivial in the sense that she is always weakly better off if she claims
damages.
11Even though we assume that the buyer takes the performance decision, the parties may renegotiate
her decision.
12It is a well known standard result of the literature that expectation damages induce an efficient
ex-post trade decision (see e.g. Posner, 1977; Shavell, 1980; Kornhauser, 1986; Craswell, 1988).
However, Go¨ller and Stremitzer (2009) explain that a contract that specifies a quality threshold
may induce expectation damages to lose its efficient breach property. Even though in the present
chapter the parties may specify a quality threshold, this problem does not occur because the
contracts we consider specify a sufficiently low or high price.
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that a contract is optimal in absence of renegotiation, it must also be optimal if costless
renegotiation is possible. After having derived the buyer’s performance decision, we
summarize the parties’ expected payoffs. Let us denote the buyer’s expected payoff,
at date 1, by B c¯v¯(β, σ) and the seller’s by S c¯v¯(β, σ), respectively. Here, c¯ ∈ [cl, ch] and
v¯ ∈ [vl, vh] indicate which cost and quality thresholds are specified in contract.
Lemma II.1: Any contract of the form (c¯ = cl, v¯ ∈ [vl, vh], p ≥ vh +max[cl − vl, 0],
q¯ = 1) induces the buyer to accept the good whenever v ≥ c and to reject otherwise.
The buyer’s expected payoff is given by
Bclv¯(β, σ) = E[W (β, σ, ω,Q∗(β, σ, ω))] + E[max[v¯ − v, 0]]− (p− cl)− β
whereas the seller receives
Sclv¯(β, σ) = p− cl − E[max[v¯ − v, 0]− σ.
PROOF: See the Appendix.
Let us define the buyer’s best response to investment of the seller as
βB(c¯, v¯, p, q¯) := arg max
β
B c¯v¯(β, σ)
and the seller’s best response to investment of the buyer as
σS(c¯, v¯, p, q¯) := arg max
σ
S c¯v¯(β, σ).
Having derived the parties’ expected payoffs in Lemma II.1, the following proposition
describes their investment incentives for different levels of the quality threshold.
Proposition II.1: For any p ≥ vh + max[cl − vl, 0] and q¯ = 1, it holds for any
σ ∈ [0, σmax] that
arg max
β
Bclv¯(β, σ) = arg max
β
E[W (β, σ, ω,Q∗(β, σ, ω))]− β
and for any β ∈ [0, βmax] that
σS(cl, vl, p, 1) = 0.
Moreover, for β = β∗, any
σ ∈ σS(cl, vh, p, 1) ≥ σ∗.
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Proof. The first statement is true because for all quality thresholds v¯ ∈ [vl, vh] the
buyer’s expected payoff
Bclv¯(β, σ) = E[W (β, σ, ω,Q∗(β, σ, ω))] + E[max[v¯ − v, 0]− (p− cl)− β
is equivalent to expected social surplus plus or minus a constant term. Moreover, the
second statement is true because the seller’s expected payoff
Sclvl(β, σ) = p− cl − σ
is strictly decreasing in σ. To prove statement three observe that, given that the buyer
invests efficiently, the difference between the seller’s expected surplus and expected
social surplus
Sclvh(β∗, σ)− [E[W (β∗, σ, ω,Q∗(β∗, σ, ω))]− β∗ − σ]
= p− vh − cl + E[min[C(β∗, ω, 1), V (σ, ω, 1)] + β∗
is monotonically increasing in σ due to Assumption II.2. Therefore it must hold for
any σ < σ∗ that
Sclvh(β∗, σ)− [E[W (β∗, σ, ω,Q∗(β∗, σ, ω))]− β∗ − σ] ≤
Sclvh(β∗, σ∗)− [E[W (β∗, σ∗, ω,Q∗(β∗, σ∗, ω))]− β∗ − σ∗]
or equivalently
[E[W (β∗, σ∗, ω,Q∗(β∗, σ∗, ω))]− β∗ − σ∗]− [E[W (β∗, σ, ω,Q∗(β∗, σ, ω))]− β∗ − σ]
≤ Sclvh(β∗, σ∗)− Sclvh(β∗, σ). (II.9)
Because social welfare is uniquely maximized by (β∗, σ∗), the term in the first line of
(II.9) is positive and consequently Sclvh(β∗, σ) < Sclvh(β∗, σ∗) for all σ ∈ [0, σ∗).
From Proposition II.1, we can deduce how different levels of the quality threshold
influence the parties’ best responses to efficient investment of the other party. The
first statement tells us that for a low cost threshold c¯ = cl and a sufficiently high price
p ≥ vh + max[cl − vl, 0], it holds for any quality threshold v¯ ∈ [vl, vh] that the buyer’s
best response is equivalent to the socially best response. Thus, if the seller invests
efficiently, it is a best response for the buyer to invest efficiently herself. Under these
contractual parameters, the seller’s best response to efficient investment of the buyer
is to not invest at all for v¯ = vl and to overinvest for v¯ = vh. Figure II.3 illustrates
that continuity of the buyer’s and the seller’s best response is a sufficient condition for
Theorem II.1 to hold.
We can now sum up our main result:
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Figure II.3.: Best responses to efficient investment of the other party for any p ≥ vh +
max[cl− vl, 0]. Note that we did not derive the exact shape of the seller’s
best response.
Theorem II.1: If the parties’ best responses are continuous and the contract specifies
a sufficiently high price p ≥ vh +max[cl− vl, 0], c¯ = cl and q¯ = 1, there exists a quality
threshold v¯∗ ∈ (vl, vh] such that the first-best investment levels (β∗, σ∗) constitute a
subgame-perfect equilibrium of the induced game.
As mentioned, the first-best contract of Theorem II.1 combines aspects from Cadillac-
and balancing contracts. It is a Cadillac contract because, as in Edlin (1996), it stip-
ulates a combination of an extreme price and an extreme threshold. The buyer has
efficient incentives to invest for two reasons. First, because the efficient breach prop-
erty of expectation damages ensures that she accepts the good whenever it is socially
desirable to do so. Second, because the low cost threshold ensures that she has to
pay damages in any state of the world. Thus, she internalizes the full benefit of her
investment indirectly through the damages she has to pay to the seller. Because the
buyer is a residual claimant of the trade relationship for any level of specified quality
v¯ ∈ [vl, vh], the quality threshold can be used as an instrument to balance the seller’s
incentives.
5. Seller takes the performance decision
In contrast to the previous section, let us assume that the seller takes the performance
decision. As before, we find that it is optimal for the parties to write an augmented
Cadillac contract. The contracts we consider in this section stipulate an intermediate
cost threshold c¯ ∈ [cl, ch], the highest possible quality v¯ = vh, a considerably low price
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p ≤ cl−max[ch− vh, 0] and that the good has to be traded q¯ = 1. Next section, where
we consider the ex-post breach game induced by expectation damages, we demonstrate
that the combination of a high quality threshold and a low price induces the parties to
behave as if the seller takes the performance decision.
In the following lemma, we show that the seller’s performance decision is efficient
and summarize the parties’ expected payoffs.
Lemma II.2: Any contract of the form (c¯ ∈ [cl, ch], v¯ = vh, p ≤ cl −max[ch− vh, 0],
q¯ = 1) induces the seller to deliver the good whenever v ≥ c. The buyer’s expected
payoff is given by
B c¯vh(β, σ) = vh − p− E[max[c− c¯, 0]− β
whereas the seller receives
S c¯vh(β, σ) = E[W (β, σ, ω,Q∗(β, σ, ω))] + E[max[c− c¯, 0]− (vh − p)− σ.
PROOF: See the Appendix.
Having derived the parties’ expected payoffs in Lemma II.2, the following proposition
describes their investment incentives for different levels of the cost threshold.
Proposition II.2: For any p ≤ cl − max[ch − vh, 0] and q¯ = 1, it holds for any
β ∈ [0, βmax] that
arg max
σ
S c¯,vh(β, σ) = arg max
σ
E[W (β, σ, ω,Q∗(β, σ, ω))]− σ
and for any σ ∈ [0, σmax] that
βB(ch, vh, p, 1) = 0.
Moreover, for σ = σ∗, any
β ∈ βB(cl, vh, p, 1) ≥ β∗.
Proof. The first statement is true, because, for all cost thresholds c¯, the seller’s
expected payoff
S c¯,vh(β, σ) = E[W (β, σ, ω,Q∗(β, σ, ω))] + E[max[c− c¯, 0]− (vh − p)− σ
is equivalent to expected social surplus plus or minus a constant term. Moreover, the
second statement is true because the buyer’s expected payoff
Bch,vh(β, σ) = vh − p− β
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is strictly decreasing in β.
To prove statement three observe that, given that the seller invests efficiently, the
difference between the buyer’s expected surplus and expected social surplus
Bclvh(β, σ∗)− [E[W (β, σ∗, ω,Q∗(β, σ∗, ω))]− β − σ∗]
= vh − p+ cl − E[min[C(β, ω, 1), V (σ∗, ω, 1)] + σ∗
is monotonically increasing in β due to Assumption II.2. Therefore it must hold for
any β < β∗ that
Bclvh(β, σ∗)− [E[W (β, σ∗, ω,Q∗(β, σ∗, ω))]− β − σ∗] ≤
Bclvh(β∗, σ∗)− [E[W (β∗, σ∗, ω,Q∗(β∗, σ∗, ω))]− β∗ − σ∗]
or equivalently
[E[W (β∗, σ∗, ω,Q∗(β∗, σ∗, ω))]− β∗ − σ∗]− [E[W (β, σ∗, ω,Q∗(β, σ∗, ω))]− β − σ∗]
≤ Bclvh(β∗, σ∗)−Bclvh(β, σ∗). (II.10)
Because social welfare is uniquely maximized by (β∗, σ∗), the term in the first line of
(II.10) is positive and consequently Bclvh(β, σ∗) < Bclvh(β∗, σ∗) for all β ∈ [0, β∗).
If the seller takes the performance decision, the combination of a high quality thresh-
old v¯ = vh and a sufficiently low price p ≤ cl−max[ch−vh, 0] ensures that, for any level
of the cost threshold c¯ ∈ [cl, ch], the seller’s best response is equivalent to the socially
best response. The buyer’s best response to efficient investment of the seller is to not
invest at all for c¯ = ch and to overinvest for c¯ = cl. We can establish the following
theorem:
Theorem II.2: If the parties’ best responses are continuous and the contract specifies
a sufficiently low price p ≤ cl − max[ch − vh, 0], v¯ = vh and q¯ = 1, there exists a
cost threshold c¯∗ ∈ [cl, ch) such that the first-best investment levels (β∗, σ∗) constitute a
subgame-perfect equilibrium of the induced game.
The intuition behind Theorem II.2 and Theorem II.1 is closely related. The com-
bination of an extremely low price and a sufficiently high quality threshold ensures
that the seller is a residual claimant of the trade relationship. Because this is the case
for any cost threshold c¯ ∈ [cl, ch], it can be used as an instrument to fine tune the
buyer’s incentives. The residual claimant argument also is the driving force behind the
efficiency result of Stremitzer (2010). He considers a situation where only the seller
makes a purely cooperative investment and finds that a contract that is governed by
expectation damages and specifies v¯ = vh induces the first best. We can, however,
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deduce from Proposition II.2 that such a pure cadillac contract performs poorly if both
parties invest. The buyer receives, in all states of the world, a fixed payoff amounting
to promised quality minus price and therefore has no incentive to invest.13
6. Ex-post breach game
So far, we assumed that either the buyer (Section 4) or the seller (Section 5) takes the
performance decision. In this section, we consider the ex-post breach game and show
that a contract of the form (c¯ = cl, v¯ ∈ [vl, vh], p ≥ vh+max[cl−vl, 0], q¯ = 1) induces
the parties to behave as if the buyer takes the performance decision whereas a contract
of the form (c¯ ∈ [cl, ch], v¯ = vh, p ≤ cl − max[ch − vh, 0], q¯ = 1) induces them to
behave as if the seller takes the performance decision. We prove the following lemma.
Lemma II.3: (i) Any contract of the form (c¯ = cl, v¯ ∈ [vl, vh], p ≥ vh+max[cl−vl, 0],
q¯ = 1) induces the following behavior on the equilibrium path. The seller always an-
nounces to deliver the good. The buyer accepts whenever v ≥ c and rejects otherwise.
(ii) Under any contract of the form (c¯ ∈ [cl, ch], v¯ = vh, p ≤ cl −max[ch − vh, 0], q¯ = 1)
the behavior on the equilibrium path is as follows. The seller announces to deliver if
and only if v ≥ c whereas the buyer always accepts delivery.
PROOF: See the Appendix.
From Lemma II.3 we can deduce that the combination of an an extreme price and
an extreme threshold determines the breaching party. Next section, we use this finding
to extend our first-best result to the case of non-binary trade.
7. Divisible contracts
As a matter of real world contracting, parties are often interested to trade several
units of the same good, Q = {0, 1, 2, ..., qmax}. In this section, we demonstrate that
our first-best results continue to hold if contracts are divisible and specify maximum
quantity q¯ = qmax. Divisible contracts are specified such that each unit together with
the per-unit price can be breached independently. Cost and quality threshold then
serve as a baseline for calculating damages for every single unit. The buyer’s benefit of
consuming q units is given by V (σ, ω, q)− pq and the seller’s profit by pq −C(β, ω, q).
It may frequently occur that some but not all units violate a threshold. Let us denote
the quantity of units that is non-conforming to stipulated cost or quality threshold by
13The first best contract of Stremitzer (2010) does not specify any cost threshold. Technically, this
situation is similar to a contract that specifies a cost threshold that is never violated, c¯ = ch.
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qc¯ or qv¯, respectively.14 The seller’s cost of producing qc¯ units can then be written as
C(β, ω, qc¯) whereas the buyer’s benefit of consuming qv¯ units is denoted by V (σ, ω, qv¯).
As before, to establish the first best, it is crucial that the parties have a broad
duty to mitigate damages. Each party is obliged to accept inferior and/or partial
performance and may only collect the difference between contractually assured and
actual performance as damages. Since contracts are divisible, the parties may breach
each single unit independently. The legal implications of breach are then, for each
unit, the same as discussed in Section 3.15 In the following lemma, we solve the ex-
post breach-game induced by expectation damages.
Lemma II.4: (i) Any contract of the form (c¯ = cl, v¯ ∈ [vl, vh], p ≥ vh +max[cl− vl, 0],
q¯ = qmax) induces the following behavior on the equilibrium path. The seller announces
to deliver qmax units and the buyer breaches to the socially efficient quantity Q∗(β, σ, ω).
(ii) Under any contract of the form (c¯ ∈ [cl, ch], v¯ = vh, p ≤ cl − max[ch − vh, 0],
q¯ = qmax) the behavior on the equilibrium path is as follows. The seller announces to
deliver the socially efficient quantity Q∗(β, σ, ω) which is then accepted by the buyer.
Proof. Because cost of production and quality are additive separable, the parties have
a brought duty to mitigate damages and contracts are divisible, we can consider each
single unit separately to check if the parties trade it or not. (i) From Lemma II.3, we
can deduce that the combination of a high price p ≥ vh + max[cl − vl, 0] and a low
cost threshold c¯ = cl induces the seller to deliver all units whereas the buyer accepts
all units that yield a positive net joint benefit.
(ii) Moreover, from Lemma II.3 we can also deduce that the combination of a low
price p ≤ cl − max[ch − vh, 0] and a high quality threshold v¯ = vh induces the seller
to deliver all units that are socially desirable to trade which are then accepted by the
buyer.
Hence, in both cases, the efficient breach property of expectation damages continues
to hold and the parties trade the socially efficient quantity Q∗(β, σ, ω).
Let us summarize the parties’ expected payoffs in the following lemma.
14These quantities depend on investments and the state of the world. For our analysis, it is only
important that qc¯ does not depend on the seller’s and that qv¯ does not depend on the buyer’s
investment. Hence, we write qc¯ instead of qc¯(β, ω).
15As an example, suppose the parties write a contract that stipulates some required quality and a
quantity of 10 units. The seller announces to deliver 9 units from which one is non-conforming
to the contract. Due to her broad duty to mitigate damages, the buyer is obliged to accept all 9
units. She may, however, claim damages. Suppose the buyer refuses to accept all 9 units. Then,
the seller may claim compensation amounting to price minus cost for all 9 units he was willing to
deliver minus the damages he would have to pay if the buyer had accepted the ninth unit.
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Lemma II.5: (i) For any p ≥ vh + max[cl − vl, 0] and q = qmax, the expected payoffs
under subgame-perfect equilibrium amount to
Bclv¯(β, σ) = E[W (β, σ, ω,Q∗(β, σ, ω))] + E[qv¯v¯ − V (σ, ω, qv¯)]− qmax(p− cl)− β
and
Sclv¯(β, σ) = qmax(p− cl)− E[qv¯v¯ − V (σ, ω, qv¯)]− σ.
Specifically,
Bclvh(β, σ) = E[W (β, σ, ω,Q∗(β, σ, ω))] + E[qmaxvh − V (σ, ω, qmax)]− qmax(p− cl)− β
and
Sclvh(β, σ) = qmax(p− cl)− E[qmaxvh − V (σ, ω, qmax)]− σ.
(ii) For any p ≤ cl−max[ch−vh, 0] and q = qmax, the expected payoffs under subgame-
perfect equilibrium amount to
B c¯vh(β, σ) = qmax(vh − p)− E[C(β, ω, qc¯)− qc¯c¯]− β
and
S c¯vh(β, σ) = E[W (β, σ, ω,Q∗(β, σ, ω))] + E[C(β, ω, qc¯)− qc¯c¯]− qmax(vh − p)− σ.
Specifically,
Bclvh(β, σ) = qmax(vh − p)− E[C(β, ω, qmax)− qmaxcl]− β.
and
Sclvh(β, σ) = E[W (β, σ, ω,Q∗(β, σ, ω))] + E[C(β, ω, qmax)− qmaxcl]− qmax(vh − p)− σ.
PROOF: See the Appendix.
Having derived the parties’ expected payoffs, we analyze in the following proposition
their investment incentives for different levels of the cost and quality thresholds.
Proposition II.3: (i) For any p ≥ vh +max[cl − vl, 0] and q = qmax, it holds for any
σ ∈ [0, σmax] that
arg max
β
Bclv¯(β, σ) = arg max
β
E[W (β, σ, ω,Q∗(β, σ, ω))]− β
and for any β ∈ [0, βmax] that
σS(cl, vl, p, q
max) = 0.
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Moreover, for β = β∗, any
σ ∈ σS(cl, vh, p, qmax) ≥ σ∗.
(ii) For any p ≤ cl −max[ch − vh, 0] and q = qmax, it holds for any β ∈ [0, βmax] that
arg max
σ
S c¯vh(β, σ) = arg max
σ
E[W (β, σ, ω,Q∗(β, σ, ω))]− σ
and for any σ ∈ [0, σmax] that
βB(ch, vh, p, q
max) = 0.
Moreover, for σ = σ∗, any
β ∈ βB(cl, vh, p, qmax) ≥ β∗.
PROOF: See the Appendix.
The intuition behind Proposition II.3 is closely related to Proposition II.1 and II.2.
The combination of an extreme price and an extreme threshold ensures that one of
the parties is a residual claimant of the trade relationship. Because this holds true
regardless how the remaining threshold is set, it can be used to balance the incentives
of the other party.
Theorem II.3: If the parties’ best responses are continuous and the contract speci-
fies a sufficiently high price p ≥ vh + max[cl − vl, 0], c¯ = cl and q¯ = qmax, there
exists a quality threshold v¯∗ ∈ (vl, vh] such that the first-best investment levels (β∗, σ∗)
constitute a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the induced game. Moreover, if the par-
ties’ best responses are continuous and the contract specifies a sufficiently low price
p ≤ cl −max[ch − vh, 0], v¯ = vh and q¯ = qmax, there exists a cost threshold c¯∗ ∈ [cl, ch)
such that the first-best investment levels (β∗, σ∗) constitute a subgame-perfect equilib-
rium of the induced game.
If the parties trade several units from the same good and contracts are divisible,
they have an additional instrument, the quantity, at hand. This cannot destroy the
optimality result obtained under binary trade. Our first-best contracts induce that
one party is interested to trade all units stipulated in contract. The other party then
breaches to the socially efficient quantity. To obtain the first best it is not necessary
to specify q¯ = qmax in contract. In theory, it is sufficient to set quantity such that it is
at least as high as the highest possible realization of the socially efficient quantity.
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8. Conclusion
We have shown that expectation damages, the default remedy of common law, can
achieve the first best in an environment of bilateral cooperative investment. In contrast
to selfish investment, where Ohlendorf (2009) has demonstrated that it is sufficient to
specify price and quantity to achieve the first best, cooperative investment requires
better contractual protection. We found that it is optimal to write a contract that
protects the contracting parties by stipulating a cost and a quality threshold that
guarantee both parties a fixed payoff in bad states of the world. The parties set one
threshold at an extreme level such that one of them becomes a residual claimant of the
trade relationship whereas the incentives of the remaining party can be balanced by
setting the remaining threshold at an intermediate level.
Similarly to a pure Cadillac contract, our first-best contracts determine which party
may have an incentive to ex-post breach the contract. Hence, our optimality result
stands in contrast to the opinion expressed in Ohlendorf (2009) that in a setting of
bilateral investment it is important that both parties face the risk of ex-post breach.
For the breaching party to sign the contract, it must receive a substantial transfer
up-front. If one believes, however, that the parties are truly sophisticated, they could
theoretically divide the ex-ante expected gains from trade by stipulating a lottery
between both types of optimal contracts.
From a legal perspective, the assumption that damages in case of non-delivery are
equivalent to specified quality minus price may seem questionable. Indeed, courts may
be inclined to use true quality instead of specified quality as a baseline for calculating
damages. Our optimality result may suggest that this is not the right way to measure
expectation damages. Also, this chapter supports the viewpoint that courts should be
ready to enforce contracts that request a broader view to mitigate damages. If courts
do not, expectation damages may lose the efficient breach property in our setting.
This chapter also contributes to the viewpoint that to judge the performance of a
breach remedy it is important to consider the interplay between breach remedy and
contract. As an example, consider Che and Chung (1999) who argue that expectation
damages perform poorly in an environment of unilateral cooperative investment. This
viewpoint has been refuted by Schweizer (2006) and Stremitzer (2009) who have shown
that it is possible to augment the contracts considered in Che and Chung (1999) such
that expectation damages can indeed induce the first best.

III. Economic Analysis of Taking
Rules: the Bilateral Case
Our analysis focuses on a situation where a landowner and the
government invest prior to the government’s taking decision.
When the government suffers from budgetary ”fiscal illusion”,
optimal compensation amounts to the hypothetical value of the
landowner’s property had she invested efficiently. In contrast, un-
der a government that maximizes social welfare, the only regime
to induce the first best grants as compensation the social bene-
fit of the taking. Consequently, if the government can only raise
capital up to a certain amount, society may be better off under a
non-benevolent government.
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1. Introduction
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that ”[...]nor shall pri-
vate property be taken for public use, without just compensation”. In the same vein,
Art. 14 of the German Constitution (Grundgesetz) allows a taking only in ”public
interest” and requires compensation to be determined under ”just consideration of in-
terests”. These and corresponding clauses in other legal systems, referred to as eminent
domain, expropriations or takings, have not only generated an enormous amount of le-
gal cases, but have also been examined by economists. They emphasize that, from an
economic perspective, ”a taking” not only captures physical acquisitions. So called reg-
ulatory takings, e.g. modifying approach paths of an airport, must also be considered
as a taking insofar as they may lower the value of property.1 Besides the basic question
about the justification for eminent domain2, economists and legal scholars have argued
how optimal compensation should look like. Whereas legal scholars often point out
justice arguments3, the economic literature focuses on the investment incentives of the
victim of a taking, often a landowner. In a provocative article, Blume et al. (1984)
assume that the government acts to maximize social welfare and show that zero com-
pensation often leads to efficient investment incentives for the landowner. Fair market
value compensation induces, however, ex-ante overinvestment in private property. The
intuition is that the potential victim is fully insured and does not take those states of
the world into account where a taking is socially desirable. Scholars have, since then,
challenged the result that no compensation outperforms fair market value compensa-
tion. A straightforward argument is that risk averse individuals are not able to insure
themselves against takings due to market failure. Consequently, the government has
to provide insurance in the form of compensation (see e.g. Blume and Rubinfeld, 1984,
1Hermalin (1995), pp. 64 f., Kaplow (1986), for an overview of cases, cf. Miceli and Segerson (1994).
2The common justification for this form of compulsory exchange can be found in the hold-out problem
(see Cohen, 1991; Goldberg et al., 1986; Miceli and Segerson, 2007, pp. 286-293). Consider, as
an example, that several parcels of land are required for a public project. In absence of eminent
domain, owners have an incentive to delay their sale in order to extract parts of the project’s
social surplus. Munch (1976) challenges the desirability of eminent domain, claiming that it may
cause increased transaction costs. Shavell (2010) finds, however, that eminent domain is socially
desirable if the quantity of parcels is sufficiently large and the government does not know their
private value.
3Many scholars have argued that, even if a government exercises its power of eminent domain to
maximize social welfare, it is necessary to compensate for the loss suffered by the taking (see e.g.
Michelman, 1967). This is connected to the Sonderopfertheorie (Maunz and Du¨rig, Art. 14, No.
366 ff.) in German law. According to it, the motive behind compensation is to ensure that all
citizens are treated equally. A taking without compensation would therefore constitute a sacrifice
that would only be levied on the owner but not on other members of the society.
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pp. 582 ff. and Calandrillo, 2005). Other articles point out ”demoralization costs”
that accrue to potential losers ”from the realization that no compensation is offered”
(Fischel and Shapiro, 1988 ; Michelman, 1967, p. 1214).
An important branch of the literature assumes that the government suffers from
”fiscal illusion”, i.e. the perceived cost of a taking is identical to compensation.4 In such
frameworks, an important motive behind compensation is to influence the government’s
behavior. As a noteworthy example, consider Hermalin (1995). He demonstrates in
a setting where only the landowner invests that compensation should amount to the
social benefit of the taking. Alternatively, related to the famous Coase (1960) theorem,
the first best can also be achieved if the landowner has to compensate the government
in absence of a taking. In both situations, the landowner maximizes expected social
welfare and therefore has efficient incentives to invest. A large branch of the literature
considers the so called constitutional choice approach to eminent domain (cf. Fischel
and Shapiro, 1989; Innes, 1997; Miceli, 2008; Nosal, 2001). Individual landowners,
acting from behind a veil of ignorance, choose compensation law without knowing
which parcels of land will be taken. Compensation is financed by a tax levied onto the
property value. The main insight gained by this approach is that the overinvestment
incentives generated by most common compensation regimes are often canceled out
because tax makes investment in property less attractive.
This chapter goes one step further than Hermalin (1995). If the government suffers
from fiscal illusion and therefore has non-benevolent motives, it makes sense to con-
sider a situation where not only the landowner but also the government may invest
ex-ante. Whereas the landowner invests to increase the value of her property, the gov-
ernment invests to increase the expected social benefit of the taking. As an example,
the landowner may invest in a new fodder silo or storehouse whereas the government
may invest to gather information on how to use the landowner’s property as a disposal
site for nuclear waste. If the government is non-benevolent, compensation regimes thus
influence both investment decisions and also the ex-post taking decision of the gov-
ernment. Suffering from fiscal illusion, it initiates a taking whenever the amount of
compensation it has to pay is less or equal than the social benefit of the taking.
We find, as our main result, that compensation should be based on the hypothetical
value of the landowner’s property had she invested efficiently. Under this regime, the
common problem that the landowner overinvests to reduce the probability of a taking
or to increase compensation does not occur. Consequently, the landowner has an
4This may be the case if the government’s behavior is driven by lobbyism. Bell (2009) argues that
the economic analysis of eminent domain also applies to situations where the state is not even
involved.
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incentive to choose the socially best response to the investment of the government. The
government, in turn, internalizes the benefit of its investment in exactly the same states
as in the social optimum and thus is a residual claimant of the bilateral relationship.
In equilibrium, both parties have efficient incentives to invest. This result can be
related to the economic analysis of contract law where it is well known that the legal
breach remedy of expectation damages, if based on socially optimal investment, induces
an efficient breach decision and efficient investment incentives (Cooter, 1985, p. 18;
Schweizer, 2005, pp. 250 ff.). In contrast, the most commonly proposed compensation
regimes perform poorly. If no compensation is paid, the government initiates too many
takings and, hence, the landowner underinvests in her property. This result stands in
contrast to Blume et al. (1984) where, if the taking decision depends on the landowner’s
investment, the no compensation regime induces overinvestment. The compensation
regime proposed by Hermalin (1995) that grants as compensation the social benefit of
the taking, henceforth social benefit compensation regime, induces the government to
not invest at all because it does not internalize any benefit of its investment.
As a benchmark, we consider the situation that the government acts benevolently,
i.e., maximizes expected social welfare. We establish, under plausible assumptions,
that the social benefit compensation regime is the only regime to generally induce the
first best. This result leads to an interesting implication. If the government can only
raise capital up to an amount below the social benefit, no optimal compensation regime
may be available. Consequently, society may be better off if the government suffers
from fiscal illusion.
The chapter is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce our model of bi-
lateral investment. We then analyze under the assumption that the government is
non-benevolent the efficiency of different compensation regimes in section 3. In sec-
tion 4, we consider, as a benchmark, the situation that the government is benevolent.
Section 5 concludes.
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Figure III.1.: Timeline of the model.
2. The model
We consider a model with two risk-neutral parties. A landowner, also referred to as
”she”, faces the risk that in the future the government or ”it” may take her property
in order to provide a public good5 (see Figure III.1). At date 0, before it is known
whether a taking occurs, the landowner may invest to increase the expected private
value of her property. Likewise, the government invests to increase the expected social
value of the public good. We denote the cost of their investments by eL ∈ [0, emaxL ]
and eG ∈ [0, emaxG ], respectively, and assume that investment is asset-specific. If the
government does not take the landowner’s property, its investment is lost whereas
the landowner’s investment is beneficial only in absence of a taking. As an example,
consider a farmer who may invest in a new fodder silo or a storehouse. The government
may consider using the farmer’s land to construct a repository for nuclear waste. Here,
the government invests to obtain information about the nature of the ground and to
tailor the repository to the geologic conditions of the area.
At date 1, the state of the world ω ∈ Ω is realized. Hence, the landowner’s private
valuation of her property (1− q)V (eL, ω), the social value of the public good qS(eG, ω)
and the amount of compensation to be paid qC(eL, eG, ω), values that depend on the
government’s taking decision q ∈ {0, 1}, become commonly known. In this decision,
to be made at date 2, q = 0 means that the landowner keeps her property whereas
q = 1 implies that it is taken and the public good is supplied. Thus, the property can
either be used by the landowner or the government, but not by both at the same time.
We assume that the landowner does not draw utility from the provision of the public
good.6 In the next section, we consider the case that the government initiates a taking
5The two defining properties of a public good, non-rivalry and non-excludability, are not crucial for
our analysis. Therefore, the term ”public good” must not be understood in a narrow sense, but
describes any good provided by public authorities.
6The potential value of the public good to society, S(eG, ω), can also be understood as the so-
cial benefit of the taking. This expression should not be confused with the social net benefit,
qS(eG, ω)− (1− q)V (eL, ω).
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if the amount of compensation it has to pay does not exceed the potential social value
of the public good. In contrast, we assume in section 4 that the government takes the
property whenever it is socially desirable to do so.
Finally, at date 3, the payoffs are realized. We discuss them in detail in section
3 and 4, for both the non-benevolent and the benevolent government, respectively.
Throughout this chapter, we assume that all information but investment is common
knowledge and use the following notation and assumptions:
Assumption III.1 For any eL ∈ [0, emaxL ], eG ∈ [0, emaxG ] and ω ∈ Ω, V (eL, ω) > 0
and S(eG, ω) > 0.
Assumption III.2 For any ω ∈ Ω, V (eL, ω) is monotonically increasing in eL
and S(eG, ω) is monotonically increasing in eG.
It directly follows from Assumption III.2 that the probability that the value of the
public good exceeds the landowner’s private valuation of her property is increasing in
eG and decreasing in eL. Let us denote the ex-post social surplus minus investment by
W (eL, eG, ω, q) = qS(eG, ω) + (1− q)V (eL, ω)− eL − eG.
For given investments eL, eG and state of the world ω, it is maximized by the socially
efficient taking decision
Q∗(eL, eG, ω) ∈ arg max
q∈{0,1}
W (eL, eG, ω, q).
We assume that the efficient investment levels, denoted (e∗L,e
∗
G), uniquely maximize the
expected social surplus
E[W (eL, eG, ω,Q
∗(eL, eG, ω))]
in [0, emaxL ] × [0, emaxG ] contingent on an efficient taking decision. Let us consider two
more benchmarks that will prove useful for our analysis. First, we are interested in
the landowner’s optimal investment in absence of the risk of a potential taking. This
private optimal level, denoted epL, uniquely maximizes
E[V (eL, ω)]− eL (III.1)
in [0, emaxL ]. Second, let us consider the case that a taking is always desirable from a
social perspective. Then, the government’s socially optimal investment level, denoted
epG, uniquely maximizes
E[S(eG, ω)]− eG (III.2)
in [0, emaxG ]. It is straightforward to show that e
p
L ≥ e∗L and epG ≥ e∗G (see Appendix
A.3.1).
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3. Non-benevolent government
As correctly observed by Hermalin (1995), one important motive behind the demand
for just compensation is to restrain the government from the tyrannical use of its right
of eminent domain. The underlying idea is that a government often acts on behalf of the
interest of the majority essentially ignoring the interest of a single property owner.7
In this section, we analyze how commonly proposed compensation regimes perform
with respect to efficiency. A regime is socially optimal if the efficient ex-post taking
decision by the government and, contingent on that, efficient bilateral investment can
be established as an equilibrium. We find that the first best is attainable by a regime
that grants as compensation the potential value of the landowner’s property had she
invested e∗L ex-ante.
The non-benevolent government internalizes the benefit of the public good but may
have to bear compensation costs.8 Its ex-post payoff minus investment is given by
UG(eL, eG, ω, q) = q[S(eG, ω)− C(eL, eG, ω)]− eG.
For given investments (eL,eG) and state of the world ω, the government’s taking decision
solves
QG(eL, eG, ω) ∈ arg max
q∈{0,1}
UG(eL, eG, ω, q).
Hence, the government initiates a taking whenever the value of the public good exceeds
the amount of compensation it has to pay. If a taking occurs, the landowner receives
compensation. If not, she enjoys the benefit of her property. Her ex-post payoff minus
investment thus amounts to
UL(eL, eG, ω, q) = (1− q)V (eL, ω) + qC(eL, eG, ω)− eL.
We can now define the government’s private best response to investment of the landowner
as
eBRG (eL) := arg max
eG∈[0,emaxG ]
E[UG(eL, eG, ω,Q
G(eL, eG, ω))]
and the landowner’s private best response to investment of the government as
eBRL (eG) := arg max
eL∈[0,emaxL ]
E[UL(eL, eG, ω,Q
G(eL, eG, ω))].
7As an alternative motivation, consider that the power of eminent domain is often used not in order
to provide a public good but in the interest of a private enterprise. In the legal literature, there
is a debate whether such takings fulfill the public use requirement, cf. Kelly (2006) and Pritchett
(2003).
8Recall that the government neglects the landowner’s interest and therefore does not take the
landowner’s benefit of compensation into account.
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Moreover, we define the socially best response to investment of the landowner as
eSBRG (eL) := arg max
eG∈[0,emaxG ]
E[W (eL, eG, ω,Q
G(eL, eG, ω))]
and the socially best response to investment of the government as
eSBRL (eG) := arg max
eL∈[0,emaxL ]
E[W (eL, eG, ω,Q
G(eL, eG, ω))].
In United States Case Law, just compensation is usually interpreted as fair market
value (Miceli and Segerson, 2007, p. 277). Let us interpret fair market value as the
value of the landowner’s property in absence of a taking, C(eL, eG, ω) = V (eL, ω).
Under a regime that grants fair market value, henceforth full compensation regime (see
Blume et al. (1984)), the landowner’s ex-post payoff minus investment amounts to
UFCL (eL, eG, ω, q) = V (eL, ω)− eL.
The government’s payoff amounts to ex-post social surplus minus the landowner’s pay-
off. It is given by
UFCG (eL, eG, ω, q) = W (eL, eG, ω, q)− [V (eL, ω)− eL] = q[S(eG, ω)− V (eL, ω)]− eG.
We can derive the following proposition:
Proposition III.1: Under the full compensation regime, in any subgame-perfect equi-
librium: (i) The government’s taking decision is efficient, QG(eL, eG, ω) = Q
∗(eL, eG, ω).
(ii) The landowner invests as if there was no risk of taking and irrespectively of the gov-
ernment’s investment, eBRL (eG) = e
p
L ≥ e∗L for all eG ∈ [0, emaxG ]. (iii) The government
chooses a socially best response to the landowner’s investment, eG ∈ eSBRG (epL).
Proof. (i) The government’s taking decision is efficient, QG(eL, eG, ω) = Q
∗(eL, eG, ω),
because it initiates a taking whenever S(eG, ω) ≥ V (eL, ω). (ii) The second statement
is true because the landowner’s expected payoff
E[V (eL, ω)]− eL
is equivalent to the one in absence of the risk of a taking (see equation (III.1)). (iii)
Taking into account the landowner’s investment and its own ex-post taking decision,
QG(eL, eG, ω) = Q
∗(eL, eG, ω), the government’s expected payoff is given by
E[W (epL, eG, ω,Q
∗(epL, eG, ω))]− E[V (epL, ω)] + eL.
Since E[V (epL, ω)] − eL does not depend on the government’s investment, it chooses a
socially best response to the landowner’s investment.
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For the landowner, we get the same overinvestment result as in Blume et al. (1984).
She overinvests because she is fully insured and hence does not take those states of
the world into account where a taking is socially desirable. The government, however,
chooses the efficient ex-post taking decision and even the socially best response to the
landowner’s investment. This is the case because the government is in the position
of a residual claimant of the bilateral relationship. It receives total social surplus
minus the value of the landowner’s property, a term that is constant with respect to
the government’s investment. Thus, even though the landowner overinvests, the full
compensation regime may not be as undesirable as in Blume et al. (1984).
Perhaps the best known result of Blume et al. (1984) is that if no compensation is
paid, the first best can be attained if the landowner’s investment does not influence
the probability of a taking.
Under the no compensation regime, the landowner’s ex-post payoff minus investment
amounts to
UNCL (eL, eG, ω, q) = (1− q)V (eL, ω)− eL.
Since the government has to pay no compensation and neglects the landowner’s interest,
its payoff is given by
UNCG (eL, eG, ω, q) = qS(eG, ω)− eG = W (eL, eG, ω, q)− (1− q)V (eL, ω) + eL.
We can establish the following proposition:
Proposition III.2: Under the no compensation regime, in any subgame-perfect equi-
librium: (i) The government always initiates a taking, QG(eL, eG, ω) = 1. (ii) Con-
sequently, the landowner does not invest at all, eBRL (eG) = 0 for all eG ∈ [0, emaxG ].
(iii) The government chooses a socially best response to the landowner’s investment,
eG ∈ eSBRG (0).
Proof. (i) The first claim is true because S(eG, ω) > 0. (ii) Because the landowner’s
expected payoff is equivalent to
E[UNCL (eL, eG, ω, 1)] = −eL,
she does not invest at all. (iii) Taking into account the landowner’s investment and
its own ex-post taking decision, QG(eL, eG, ω) = 1, the government’s expected payoff
is given by
E[W (0, eG, ω, 1)]− E[0V (0, ω)] + eL = E[W (0, eG, ω, 1)] + eL.
Thus, given that a taking occurs with certainty, the government plays a socially best
response.
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In contrast to Blume et al. (1984), the no compensation regime performs poorly
in our setting. The government always takes the landowner’s property and therefore
induces her to not invest at all. The government’s investment corresponds to our third
benchmark where a taking is always socially desirable, eBRG (eL) = e
p
G. Note that e
p
G
is generally not a socially best response to efficient investment of the landowner (see
Appendix A.3.1). It is, however, an optimal choice if takings occur with certainty.
Hermalin (1995) shows, in a setting where the state is non-benevolent but only the
landowner invests, that the first best can be induced by a regime that grants the
landowner as compensation the social benefit of the taking, C(eL, eG, ω) = S(eG, ω).
Under this regime, henceforth social benefit compensation regime, the landowner’s
ex-post payoff minus investment amounts to
USBCL (eL, eG, ω, q) = (1− q)V (eL, ω) + qS(eG, ω)− eL = W (eL, eG, ω, q) + eG.
And hence the government’s payoff is given by
USBCG (eL, eG, ω, q) = −eG.
In principle, the government is indifferent between initiating a taking or not. We can
then establish the following proposition:
Proposition III.3: Under the social benefit compensation regime, assuming that the
government initiates a taking whenever it is socially desirable, in any subgame-perfect
equilibrium: (i) The government does not invest at all, eBRG (eL) = 0 for all
eL ∈ [0, emaxL ]. (ii) The landowner chooses a socially best response to the government’s
investment, eL ∈ eSBRL (0).
Proof. (i) Obvious. (ii) The landowner’s expected payoff amounts to
E[W (eL, 0, ω,Q
∗(0, eL, ω))] + eG.
Hence, she chooses a socially optimal best response.
In contrast to Hermalin (1995), the social benefit compensation regime performs
poorly in our setting. The government does not internalize any benefit of its invest-
ment and thus has no incentive to invest. Suppose that the landowner receives as
compensation some fraction α ∈ (0, 1) from the social benefit of the taking. Because
(1 − α)S(eG, ω) > 0, the non-benevolent government always initiates a taking. Since
the landowner’s investment does not influence the value of the public good, she has no
incentive to invest.
We have established that all standard compensation regimes fail to induce the first
best. Consider a regime, henceforth referred to as social optimal property value com-
pensation regime, where the landowner receives as compensation the hypothetical value
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of her property had she invested efficiently, C(eL, eG, ω) = V (e
∗
L, ω). Under this regime,
the landowner receives:
USOPV CL (eL, eG, ω, q) = (1− q)V (eL, ω) + qV (e∗L, ω)− eL
= W (eL, eG, ω, q)− qS(eG, ω) + qV (e∗L, ω) + eG.
Consequently, the government’s payoff is given by
USOPV CG (eL, eG, ω, q) = q[S(eG, ω)− V (e∗L, ω)]− eG
= qS(eG, ω)− V (e∗L, ω) + (1− q)V (e∗L, ω)− eG
= W (e∗L, eG, ω, q)− V (e∗L, ω) + e∗L.
This allows us to establish the main proposition of this chapter:
Proposition III.4: Under the social optimal property value compensation regime, the
socially efficient investment levels (e∗L, e
∗
G) and the socially efficient ex-post taking de-
cision QG(e∗L, e
∗
G, ω) = Q
∗(e∗L, e
∗
G, ω) constitute the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium
outcome.
Proof. The government initiates a taking whenever S(eG, ω) ≥ V (e∗L, ω). We can
therefore write the government’s ex-post taking decision asQG(eL, eG, ω) = Q
∗(e∗L, eG, ω).
Let us establish that eG = e
∗
G is the unique best response to any investment of the
landowner. The government’s expected payoff is given by
E[W (e∗L, eG, ω,Q
∗(e∗L, eG, ω))]− E[V (e∗L, ω)] + e∗L
Because (e∗L, e
∗
G) uniquely maximize expected welfare and E[V (e
∗
L, ω)] + e
∗
L does not
depend on the government’s investment, e∗G uniquely maximizes the government’s ex-
pected payoff.
Given the government’s taking decision and investment, the landowner’s expected
payoff amounts to
E[W (eL, e
∗
G, ω,Q
∗(e∗L, e
∗
G, ω))]− E[Q∗(e∗L, e∗G, ω)(S(e∗G, ω) + V (e∗L, ω))] + e∗G.
To check that eL = e
∗
L is the unique best response, we show that it maximizes
E[W (eL, e
∗
G, ω,Q
∗(e∗L, e
∗
G, ω))]. Take any eL 6= e∗L, then it must hold that
E[W (e∗L, e
∗
G, ω,Q
∗(e∗L, e
∗
G, ω))]
>E[W (eL, e
∗
G, ω,Q
∗(eL, e∗G, ω))]
≥E[W (eL, e∗G, ω,Q∗(e∗L, e∗G, ω))]. (III.3)
The first inequality follows from e∗L and e
∗
G being unique welfare maximizers. The
second and the third line of (III.3) only differ in the ex-post taking decision. Because
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the taking decision is socially optimal and conditions on true investment in the second
line but on e∗L in the third line, the second inequality must hold. We have established
that e∗L is the unique best response to e
∗
G, which proves the claim.
The intuition behind our main result is the following. The government takes the
property whenever the compensation it has to pay is less than or equal to the social
benefit of the taking. Since compensation is equivalent to the hypothetical value of the
landowner’s property had she invested e∗L, the taking decision depends on the govern-
ment’s but not on the landowner’s investment. If the government invests eG = e
∗
G, it
initiates a taking in exactly the same states of the world a benevolent social planner
would do so. Consequently, the landowner internalizes the benefit of her investment
with exactly the same probability as in the first best. Therefore eL = e
∗
L is the unique
best response to efficient investment of the government. If the landowner invests effi-
ciently, the government receives expected social surplus minus the landowner’s benefit,
a term that is constant with respect to the government’s investment. Because e∗G is the
socially best response to e∗L, it must also be the best response for the government.
Having derived that the social optimal property compensation rule induces the first
best, we can establish the following theorem:
Theorem III.1: The investment levels induced by the compensation regimes discussed
in this section can be ranked in the following way:9
∀eL ∈ eSBCL : eFCL = epL ≥ eL ≥ eSOPV CL = e∗L ≥ eNCL = 0 (III.4)
∀eG ∈ eFCG : eNCG = epG ≥ eSOPV CG = e∗G ≥ eG ≥ eSBCG = 0. (III.5)
All regimes other than the SOPVC regime, can, however, not be ranked with respect to
their welfare properties.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.2.
Any regime other than the SOPVC regime fails to induce the first best in different
respects. Under different parameter constellations, the size of these inefficiencies may
vary greatly. Hence, any of these regimes may outperform the other two.
Our main result suggests that if one believes that the government neglects the interest
of the landowner, compensation should not be based on actual but on socially optimal
investment. Blume et al. (1984), who assume that the government is benevolent,
9Here, the notation is as follows. The landowner’s optimal investment level under the full compen-
sation regime is denoted by eFCL . Because the landowner’s optimal investment need not be unique
under the social benefit compensation regime, eSBCL denotes the set of optimal investment levels
under this regime. The remaining variables are defined in a similar way, where SOPVC stands for
social optimal property value compensation and NC for no compensation.
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derive a related result. If the government can commit to initiate a taking whenever
the social benefit of the taking is higher than the hypothetical value of the landowner’s
property had she invested efficiently, any lump sum compensation plan induces the
landowner to invest according to the first best. Thus, the benevolent government would
like to commit itself to exactly the same ex-post taking decision the non-benevolent
government chooses out of its own interest. Next section, we consider the situation
that the government is benevolent but cannot commit to any ex-post taking decision.
4. Benevolent government
In this section, the government’s interest coincides with those of a benevolent social
planner. We consider a wide class of compensation regimes and derive that, under
certain plausible assumptions, the social benefit compensation regime is the only one
to generally induce the first best. The government’s ex-post payoff minus investment
is equivalent to ex-post social welfare minus investment. It is given by
UG(eL, eG, ω, q) = qS(eG, ω) + (1− q)V (eL, ω)− eL − eG.
The government uses its right of eminent domain whenever it is socially desirable to
do so, QG(eL, eG, ω) = Q
∗(eL, eG, ω). At the investment stage, it chooses the socially
best response to the investment strategy of the landowner contingent on its own ex-
post taking decision. Consequently, the first best can be established as an equilibrium
whenever the landowner’s investment constitutes a socially best response to the gov-
ernment’s investment. The landowner’s ex-post payoff minus investment is the same
as in the previous section. It amounts to
UL(eL, eG, ω, q) = (1− q)V (eL, ω) + qC(eL, eG, ω)− eL.
In the following, we only consider compensation regimes that are non-punishing. In
any state of the world ω ∈ Ω , the amount of compensation paid to the landowner
C(eL, eG, ω), is non-decreasing in eL. The rationale behind this restriction is that the
idea behind compensation is to protect but not to punish the landowner. Moreover,
let us assume that compensation may not exceed the social benefit of the taking,
C(eL, eG, ω) ≤ S(eG, ω) for all ω ∈ Ω. The government may be wealth-constrained or
public pressure may prevent an exceedingly high amount of compensation. We establish
the following proposition:
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Proposition III.5: If compensation is non-punishing and may not exceed the so-
cial benefit of the taking, only the social benefit compensation regime, C(eL, eG, ω) =
S(eG, ω), generally induces the first best. Any other regime induces that the landowner’s
best response to efficient investment of the government is to overinvest, ∀eL ∈ eBRL (e∗G),
eL ≥ e∗L.
Proof. For ease of notation, let us omit the arguments e∗G and ω. The landowner’s
expected payoff is given by
E[UL(eL)] =E[(1−Q∗(eL))V (eL)] + E[Q∗(eL)C(eL)]− eL
=E[W (eL, Q
∗(eL))]− {E[Q∗(eL)(S − C(eL))] + e∗G}. (III.6)
Under the social benefit compensation regime, (III.6) coincides with expected social
welfare. Thus, the landowner has efficient incentives to invest. Let us consider any
other compensation regime and assume that there exists some eL < e
∗
L such that
E[UL(eL)] ≥ E[UL(e∗L)]. Because expected social surplus is uniquely maximized by e∗L
and e∗G, this can only be the case if
−E[Q∗(eL)(S − C(eL))] > −E[Q∗(e∗L)(S − C(e∗L))].
Let us subtract E[Q∗(e∗L)C(eL)] from both sides of the inequality. This term represents
the hypothetical expected value of compensation if the landowner invests eL, but the
government bases its taking decision on e∗L. After reorganizing, we get
E[Q∗(e∗L)S]− E[Q∗(eL)S]+
E[Q∗(eL)C(eL)]− E[Q∗(e∗L)C(eL)] > E[Q∗(e∗L)C(e∗L)]− E[Q∗(e∗L)C(eL)]. (III.7)
The right-hand side of (III.7) is greater or equal than zero because the expected amount
of compensation is non-decreasing in eL. After reorganizing, observe that the left hand-
side can only be positive if
−E[(Q∗(eL)−Q∗(e∗L))(S − C(eL))] > 0. (III.8)
In equation (III.8) we consider the expected value of the social benefit of the taking
minus compensation in all states of the world where a taking occurs if the decision
is based on eL, but not if it is based on e
∗
L. The left-hand side of (III.8) is negative
because in any state it must hold that compensation does not exceed the social benefit
of the taking. If compensation is equivalent to the social benefit of the taking in all
states, the regime must coincide with the social benefit compensation regime. Thus,
under any other regime, (III.8) is violated and therefore ∀eL ∈ eBRL (e∗G), eL ≥ e∗L.10
10For any regime other than the social benefit compensation regime it is always possible to
construct an example where eBRL (e
∗
G) > e
∗
L. In such an example, it must hold that
E[(Q∗(eL)−Q∗(e∗L))C(eL)] << E[(Q∗(eL)−Q∗(e∗L))S].
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The intuition behind Proposition III.5 is straightforward. The landowner has an in-
centive to overinvest for two reasons. First, in contrast to the objective of a benevolent
social planner, the landowner’s investment may increase her expected amount of com-
pensation whereas it does not affect the value of the public good. Second, if a taking
occurs, the landowner receives an amount of compensation that is generally less than
the social benefit of the taking. She thus has an incentive to overinvest to reduce the
probability that the government takes her property. Under the social benefit compen-
sation regime both sources of inefficiency do not exist. Consequently, the landowner
has efficient incentives to invest.
All rules we examined in the previous section are included in the class of compen-
sation regimes considered in Proposition III.5. The classical Blume et al. (1984) no
compensation result is connected to Proposition III.5 in the following way: If the prob-
ability of a taking is independent of investment, any compensation regime under which
investment does not influence the expected amount of compensation induces the first
best. In that case, in equation (III.6) the term in the braces does not depend on
the landowner’s investment. Hence, her investment incentives coincide with those of a
benevolent social planner.
5. Conclusion
This chapter considers a situation where the government has the power to take private
property. If due compensation is paid, incentives are often distorted. This literature
has begun blooming with the seminal work by Blume et al. (1984).
Perhaps our most interesting finding is that social welfare may be higher under the
non-benevolent government. If the government is benevolent, only the social benefit
compensation regime is generally able to induce the first best. If, however, the govern-
ment is wealth-constrained, i.e., can only raise capital up to a certain amount that lies
below the social benefit of the taking, the social benefit compensation regime is not
available. Thus, there may not exist any compensation regime to induce the first best.
If the government is non-benevolent, optimal compensation is equivalent to the hypo-
thetical value of the landowner’s property had she invested efficiently. This amount of
compensation is, given that a taking occurs, generally less than the social benefit of the
taking. Consequently, if the government is wealth constrained, society may be better
off if the government disregards the interest of the landowner.
According to U.S. law, one of the main motives behind compensation is that compen-
sation should be just. If the government is non-benevolent, the optimal compensation
regime grants to the landowner, in equilibrium, exactly the value of her property. In
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other words, she is perfectly insured against the government’s power of eminent domain.
Under the social benefit compensation regime, which is the only regime to be generally
optimal if the government is benevolent, the landowner receives the value of the public
good. Obviously, this amount may exceed the private value of the landowner’s property
by far.
It is also important to emphasize that one should distinguish between two forms
of public actions. First, law constitutes a set of rules that both the government and
the landowner have to follow. Of course, one of the main goals of law should be to
maximize social welfare. In contrast, the government’s objectives may, as we explained,
not coincide with those of a benevolent social planner.
For future research, it seems to be an interesting prospect to consider a setting where
the government is non-benevolent but subject to judicial control with respect to the
necessity of the taking. Ex-post, the government may only initiate a taking whenever
it is socially desirable. Ex-ante, however, the government invests to maximize the
difference between the social benefit of the taking and the amount of compensation it
has to pay.
A. Appendices
1. Appendix to Chapter I
1.1. Proofs of Propositions and Lemmas
Proof of Proposition I.1 (i).
If the buyer announces acceptance of the good, the parties receive their respective
trade surpluses, p − c and v − p, and share the potential renegotiation surplus with
the seller receiving α[c − v]+. If the buyer announces refusal of the good, the seller’s
investment serves as a threat point during renegotiation. The parties share a potential
renegotiation surplus with the seller receiving α[v − c]+. Hence the buyer announces
breach if
−e+ (1− α)[v − c]+ > v − p+ (1− α)[c− v]+ (A.1)
or equivalently
v < vˆ ≡ min [p− e− c
α
+ c, vh]. (A.2)
Anticipating this, the seller expects to receive the following payoff at date 1:
URD(e) =
∫ ch
cl
∫ vˆ
0
(e+ α[v − c]+)Fv(v|e)dv Gc(c|e) dc (A.3)
+
∫ ch
cl
∫ vh
vˆ
(p− c+ α[c− v]+)Fv(v|e)dv Gc(c|e) dc− e
=
∫ ch
cl
{[p− e− c][1− F (vˆ|e)] + α
∫ vˆ
0
[v − c]+Fv(v|e) dv
+ α
∫ vh
vˆ
[c− v]+Fv(v|e)dv}Gc(c|e) dc.
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The term inside {...} can be rewritten as:
α
∫ vˆ
0
[v − c]+Fv(v|e) dv + α
∫ vh
0
[c− v]+Fv(v|e) dv (A.4)
− α
∫ vˆ
0
[c− v]+Fv(v|e) dv + [p− e− c][1− F (vˆ|e)]
= α
∫ vˆ
0
(v − c)Fv(v|e) dv + α
∫ vh
0
[c− v]+Fv(v|e) dv + [p− e− c][1− F (vˆ|e)]
= α
∫ vˆ
0
(v − c)Fv(v|e) dv − α
∫ c
0
(v − c)Fv(v|e) dv + [p− e− c][1− F (vˆ|e)]
= α
∫ vˆ
c
(v − c)Fv(v|e) dv + [p− e− c][1− F (vˆ|e)].
Integration by parts yields,
α(vˆ − c)F (vˆ|e)− α
∫ vˆ
c
F (v|e) dv + [p− e− c][1− F (vˆ|e)]. (A.5)
Using (A.5) we can rewrite (A.3) as
URD(e) =
∫ ch
cl
{[p− e− c][1− F (vˆ|e)] + α(vˆ − c)F (vˆ|e)− α
∫ vˆ
c
F (v|e) dv}Gc(c|e) dc
(A.6)
=
∫ ch
cl
{p− e− c+ F (vˆ|e) α[vˆ − (p− e− c
α
+ c)]− α
∫ vˆ
c
F (v|e) dv}Gc(c|e) dc.
Applying integration by parts again yields,
URD(e) = [{p− e− c− α
∫ vˆ
c
F (v|e) dv}G(c|e)]chcl +
∫ ch
cl
G(c|e) dc (A.7)
− α
∫ ch
cl
F (c|e)G(c|e) dc+ α
∫ ch
cl
dvˆ
dc
F (vˆ|e)G(c|e) dc
+
∫ ch
cl
F (vˆ|e) α[vˆ − (p− e− c
α
+ c)] Gc(c|e) dc.
As an intermediate step, we can simplify the term in the last line of (A.7):∫ ch
cl
F (vˆ|e) α[vˆ − (p− e− c
α
+ c)] Gc(c|e) dc. (A.8)
First we define cˆ ≡ p−e−αvh
1−α . Note that c < cˆ implies vˆ = vh, whereas c > cˆ implies
vˆ = p−e−c
α
+ c. In the latter case (A.8) is equal to zero. Thus, we can rewrite (A.8):∫ cˆ
cl
[αvh − p+ e+ (1− α)c] Gc(c|e) dc (A.9)
= (1− α)
∫ cˆ
cl
[
αvh − p+ e
1− α + c] Gc(c|e) dc
= (1− α)
∫ cˆ
cl
(c− cˆ) Gc(c|e) dc.
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Using (A.9) we can rewrite (A.7):
URD(e) = [{p− e− c− α
∫ vˆ
c
F (v|e) dv}G(c|e)]chcl +
∫ ch
cl
G(c|e) dc (A.10)
− α
∫ ch
cl
F (c|e)G(c|e) dc+ α
∫ ch
cl
dvˆ
dc
F (vˆ|e)G(c|e) dc
+ (1− α)
∫ cˆ
cl
(c− cˆ) Gc(c|e) dc.
Let v˜ ≡ p−e−ch
α
+ ch and note that
dvˆ
dc
= 0 if c < cˆ. Then we can rewrite (A.10):
URD(e) = p− e− ch − α
∫ v˜
ch
F (v|e) dv +
∫ ch
cl
G(c|e) dc (A.11)
− α
∫ ch
cl
F (c|e)G(c|e) dc− (1− α)
∫ ch
cˆ
F (vˆ|e)G(c|e) dc
+ (1− α){[(c− cˆ)G(c|e)]cˆcl −
∫ cˆ
cl
G(c|e) dc}
= p− e− ch − α
∫ v˜
ch
F (v|e) dv +
∫ ch
cl
G(c|e) dc
− α
∫ ch
cl
F (c|e)G(c|e) dc− (1− α)
∫ ch
cˆ
F (vˆ|e)G(c|e) dc
− (1− α)
∫ cˆ
cl
G(c|e) dc.
The seller’s optimal investment level, eRD, is represented by the following first-order
condition:
U ′RDe (e
RD) = F (v˜|eRD)− α
∫ v˜
ch
Fe(v|eRD) dv +
∫ ch
cl
Ge(c|eRD) dc (A.12)
− α
∫ ch
cl
[Fe(c|eRD)G(c|eRD) + F (c|eRD)Ge(c|eRD)] dc
− (1− α)
∫ ch
cˆ
[Fe(vˆ|eRD)− 1
α
Fv(vˆ|eRD)] G(c|eRD) dc
− (1− α)
∫ ch
cˆ
F (vˆ|eRD)Ge(c|eRD) dc+ [1− F (vˆ|eRD)]G(cˆ|eRD)
− (1− α)
∫ cˆ
cl
Ge(c|eRD) dc− 1 = 0.
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Proof of Proposition I.1 (iii).
We have already shown in the main text that the seller overinvests relative to the
socially optimal level if p = 0 has been specified in contract and condition (I.9) holds.
We now show that the seller will not invest less than eRD, if a positive price has been
specified in contract. Consider the limit of (I.7) as α goes to zero:
lim
α→0
U ′RD(eRD) = F (v˜|eRD) +
∫ ch
cl
Ge(c|eRD) dc (A.13)
−
∫ ch
cˆ
[Fe(vˆ|eRD)−∞Fv(vˆ|eRD)] G(c|eRD) dc
−
∫ ch
cˆ
F (vˆ|eRD)Ge(c|eRD) dc+ [1− F (vˆ|eRD)]G(cˆ|eRD)
−
∫ cˆ
cl
Ge(c|eRD) dc− 1 = 0.
Fixing e = eRD and considering U ′RD as a function of p, the seller will invest at least
eRD if U ′RD(p) ≥ 0 for all p > 0.1 After reorganizing, U ′RD(p) ≥ 0 for all p > 0 is
equivalent to the following condition:
lim
α→0
U ′RD(p) = F (v˜|eRD) + [1− F (vˆ|eRD)]G(cˆ|eRD) (A.14)
−
∫ ch
cˆ
[Fe(vˆ|eRD)−∞Fv(vˆ|eRD)] G(c|eRD) dc
+
∫ ch
cˆ
[1− F (vˆ|eRD)]Ge(c|eRD) dc ≥ 1 ∀ p > 0.
Recall that c ≥ cˆ implies vˆ = p−e−c
α
+ c ≤ vh. Then, the term in the second line makes
sure that condition (A.14) holds unless vˆ ≤ 0 or cˆ ≥ ch for all c. In the latter two
cases, the term in the second line is equal to zero. Hence, what is left is to show is that
condition (A.14) holds if vˆ ≤ 0 or cˆ ≥ ch. First, since vˆ ≤ 0 must hold for all c it must
in particular hold for c = cl.This implies that
p− eRD − cl
α
+ cl ≤ 0⇔ cl ≥ p− e
RD
(1− α) . (A.15)
Now since p− eRD > p− eRD − αvh, we can conclude that
cl =
p− eRD
(1− α) >
p− eRD − αvh
(1− α) ≡ cˆ. (A.16)
Then the last term of (A.14) is equal to 1 and because the other terms are all nonnega-
tive, condition (A.14) must hold. The last step is to prove that condition (A.14) holds
if cˆ ≥ ch. This case directly implies that
p ≥ eRD + ch. (A.17)
1Strict quasi-concavity of URD in e for all p ensures that URDis single peaked. Then U ′RD(p) ≥ 0
ensures that the seller invests at least e = eRD for a given p.
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Figure A.1.: Expectation damages without renegotiation if the buyer can breach.
But if (A.17) holds, F (v˜|eRD) = 1 must be true. Then again, because all other terms
are nonnegative, condition (A.14) must hold. Hence condition (A.14) holds for all p > 0
and we have shown that the seller will invest at least eRD if p > 0 has been specified in
the contract. Since eRD > e∗, the seller will overinvest relative to the socially efficient
level for any price.
1.2. Allowing for Buyer’s breach
Expectation damages without renegotiation
Rather than assuming ad hoc that the buyer never breaches the contract under expec-
tation damages, we now show that legal remedies of contract law always induce the
buyer to accept delivery.
If quality is conforming, non-acceptance (A¯) of the seller’s good constitutes breach.
Hence, the seller can recover damages of [p− c]+ (Figure A.1). The buyer will accept
the good if
v − p ≥ −[p− c]+ ⇔ v ≥
{
p if p ≤ c
c otherwise
. (A.18)
The natural assumption, v¯ > p, implies that (A.18) must hold. The first case, p ≤ c,
must hold because v ≥ v¯ > p. The second case can only occur if p > c. Then, since
v ≥ v¯ > p it must hold that v > c. Hence, the buyer will accept delivery in equilibrium.
If, on the other hand, the seller breaches by either refusing delivery or by delivering
a good of non-conforming quality, we need to consider two cases. This is because,
under the substantial performance doctrine of common law, different remedies will be
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available depending on whether the non-conformity is only partial or amounts to total
breach. Let us define partial breach as a realization of v which is lower than the quality
threshold v¯ but greater than or equal to some cut-off value vTB. Similarly, let total
breach be defined as a realization of v which is lower than vTB (non-delivery is always
considered to be total breach).
Non-conformity constitutes partial breach, vTB ≤ v < v¯.
If quality is non-conforming but breach due to non-conforming quality is only par-
tial, vTB ≤ v < v¯, the buyer is only allowed to demand damages for partial breach.
Therefore, if the buyer rejects, the supplier can recover damages of [p− c− (v¯ − v)]+.
For v¯ > p, we see that v¯ − p > 0 ≥ −[p − c − (v¯ − v)]+. Hence the buyer will accept
delivery.
Non-conformity constitutes total breach, v < vTB.
If the non-conformity amounts to total breach, v < vTB, the buyer can terminate
the contract and ask for restitution (R) to recover any progress payment that he might
have made to the seller. As the good has no value to the seller, both parties receive
zero payoff. Alternatively, the buyer can recover damages for total breach, [v¯ − p]+.
Hence the buyer will receive v¯ − p if he accepts the good and since we assume v¯ > p,
he will also receive v¯ − p if he rejects the good. Assuming the buyer accepts if he is
indifferent, the buyer will accept delivery in equilibrium.
Expectation damages with renegotiation
If we assume that parties renegotiate towards the ex-post efficient trade decision, ad-
justments to the payoffs in Figure A.1 need to be made. For example, if the buyer
rejects the seller’s good when trade is efficient, v > c, the parties renegotiate and split
the resulting surplus, v− c, according to their respective bargaining powers. Similarly,
the parties will renegotiate if the buyer accepts the good, even though c > v. We
make one additional and crucial assumption with respect to vTB, which we did not
need in the case where renegotiation was ruled out: Under the substantial performance
doctrine of common law, the buyer may only treat the non-conformity as total breach
if v < vTB ≤ v¯. In civil law countries a similar provision requires non-conformity to be
”fundamental”. One test to determine if non-conformity can be treated as total breach
is whether or not the buyer still has an interest in the good despite non-conformity (in
this case the non-conformity is only partial). We assume that the court will conclude
that such an interest exists whenever the parties would freely renegotiate to trade:
v > c. This implies setting vTB = c (see Figure A.2).
2
Conforming quality, v ≥ v¯ > vTB = c.
2Note that we continue to assume that p ≤ v¯. This allows us to simplify payoffs.
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Figure A.2.: Expectation damages with renegotiation if the buyer can breach.
The buyer will accept the good if
v − p+ (1− α) [c− v]+ ≥ −[p− c]+ + (1− α) [v − c]+ ⇐⇒ (A.19)
v − p ≥ −[p− c]+ + (1− α)(v − c)
or
v − p ≥
{
1− α)(v − c) if p < c
c− p+ (1− α)(v − c) if p ≥ c . (A.20)
The first case, p < c, holds if v ≥ p−c
α
+ c. This must be true as v ≥ v¯ implies
v > c and the first case can only occur if p < c. The second case holds because
v − c ≥ (1− α)(v − c). Hence the buyer will accept in equilibrium.
Non-conformity constitutes partial breach, vTB = c ≤ v < v¯.
The buyer will accept the good if
v¯ − p+ (1− α) [c− v]+ ≥ −[p− c− (v¯ − v)]+ + (1− α) [v − c]+ ⇐⇒ (A.21)
v¯ − p ≥ −[p− c− (v¯ − v)]+ + (1− α) (v − c)
or:
v¯ − p− (1− α) (v − c) ≥
{
0 if v − c ≤ v¯ − p
v¯ − p− (v − c) if v − c > v¯ − p .
In the first case, the condition must hold since v¯ − p ≥ v − c ≥ (1− α) (v − c). In the
second case, the condition must hold because v − c > 0 and (1− α) ≤ 1. Hence the
buyer will accept in equilibrium.
Non-conformity constitutes total breach, v < vTB = c.
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As v¯ − p + (1 − α) [v − c]+ > (1 − α) [v − c]+ the buyer chooses ED if he rejects
delivery. The buyer will therefore accept if:
v¯ − p+ (1− α) [c− v]+ > v¯ − p+ (1− α) [v − c]+ ⇐⇒
v¯ − p+ (1− α) (c− v) > v¯ − p,
which will always hold for v < c.
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2. Appendix to Chapter II
2.1. Proofs of Propositions and Lemmas
Proof of Lemma II.1
Proof. The buyer announces to accept whenever BD,A(β, σ, ω, q) ≥ BD,A¯(β, σ, ω, q) or
equivalently
max[v, v¯]− p− (c− cl) + (1− α)max[c− v, 0] ≥
−max[p− cl −max[v¯ − v, 0], 0] + (1− α)max[v − c, 0]. (A.22)
Note that the first max operator on the second line of (A.22) can be dropped because
p− cl−max[v¯− v, 0] ≥ 0 ∀ (v, v¯) ∈ [vl, vh]2. Consequently, we can simplify (A.22) and
conclude that the buyer announces to accept (A) whenever v ≥ c.
To obtain the seller’s expected payoff, we first have to derive his ex-post payoff.
Using that the buyer performs whenever v ≥ c and inserting the contract terms into
(II.2) yields the seller’s ex-post payoff for the case that the buyer performs. It amounts
to
p− cl −max[v¯ − v, 0].
Likewise, we get the seller’s ex-post payoff for the case that the buyer does not perform
by inserting the contract terms into (II.4). In that case, the seller also receives
p− cl −max[v¯ − v, 0].
Note that all renegotiation terms are equivalent to zero because the buyer’s perfor-
mance decision is efficient. We get the seller’s expected payoff by merging both cases,
subtracting the seller’s investment level and taking expectations. The buyer’s expected
payoff is equivalent to expected social surplus minus the seller’s expected payoff.
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Proof of Lemma II.2
Proof. The seller announces to deliver whenever SD,A(β, σ, ω, q) ≥ SD¯,ED(β, σ, ω, q)3
or equivalently
p−min[c, c¯]− (vh − v) + α max[c− v, 0] ≥
−max[vh − p−max[c− c¯, 0], 0] + α max[v − c, 0]. (A.23)
Note that the first max operator on the second line of (A.23) can be dropped because
vh− p−max[c− c¯, 0] ≥ 0 ∀ (c, c¯) ∈ [cl, ch]2. Consequently, we can simplify (A.23) and
conclude that the seller announces to deliver (D) whenever v ≥ c.
To obtain the buyer’s expected payoff, we first have to derive her ex-post payoff.
Using that the seller performs whenever v ≥ c and inserting the contract terms into
(II.1) yields the buyer’s ex-post payoff for the case that the seller performs. It amounts
to
vh − p−max[c− c¯, 0].
Likewise, we get the buyer’s ex-post payoff for the case that the seller does not perform
by inserting the contract terms into (II.5). In that case, the buyer also receives
vh − p−max[c− c¯, 0].
Note that all renegotiation terms are equivalent to zero because the seller’s perfor-
mance decision is efficient. We get the buyer’s expected payoff by merging both cases,
subtracting the buyer’s investment level and taking expectations. The seller’s expected
payoff is equivalent to expected social surplus minus the buyer’s expected payoff.
3Recall that, after the seller announced not to deliver, the buyer is weakly better off claiming damages
than staying passive.
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Proof of Lemma II.3
Proof. We proof the first part only. The second part can be proven in a similar
way. (i) To proof Lemma II.3, we solve the game depicted in Figure II.2 by backwards
induction. If the seller announces not to deliver (D¯), the buyer is indifferent between
claiming damages (ED) and staying passive (0).4 In both cases she receives an ex-post
payoff of
BD¯,ED(β, σ, ω, q) = (1− α) max[v − c, 0].
If the seller announces to deliver (D), the buyer’s best response is to accept (A) if
BD,A(β, σ, ω, q) ≥ BD,A¯(β, σ, ω, q) or equivalently
max[v, v¯]− p− (c− cl) + (1− α)max[c− v, 0] ≥
−max[p− cl −max[v¯ − v, 0], 0] + (1− α)max[v − c, 0]. (A.24)
Note that the first max operator on the right-hand side of (A.24) can be dropped be-
cause p−cl−max[v¯−v, 0] ≥ 0 ∀ (v, v¯) ∈ [vl, vh]2. Consequently, we can simplify (A.24)
and conclude that the buyer announces to accept (A) whenever v ≥ c. Anticipating
the buyer’s decision, the seller always delivers (D). To see this, first consider the case
where v ≥ c. The seller announces to deliver if SD,A(β, σ, ω, q) ≥ SD¯,ED(β, σ, ω, q) or
equivalently
p ≥ max[v¯ − v, 0] + cl + α(v − c).
Note that
p ≥ vh + cl − (1− α)v − αc ≥ max[v¯ − v, 0] + cl + α(v − c)
for any v¯ ∈ [vl, vh]. Consequently, the seller delivers. Finally, consider the case where
the buyer refuses to accept, v < c. Here, the seller announces to deliver (D) because
SD,A¯(β, σ, ω, q) ≥ SD¯,ED(β, σ, ω, q) or equivalently
max[p− cl − max[v¯ − v, 0], 0] ≥ 0.
4The buyer receives no damages if she opts for (ED). To see this, insert the contract terms into
equation (II.5).
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Proof of Lemma II.5
Proof. (i) Recall that divisibility allows us to treat each unit as a separate contract.
We know from Lemma II.1 that the seller’s payoff per unit does not depend on whether
the buyer accepts the unit or not. Thus, ex-post, the seller receives a payoff amount-
ing to p − cl − max[v¯ − Vi(σ, ω)] for each of the qmax units the parties stipulated in
contract. Because qv¯ of the qmax units are non-conforming to the contract, the seller’s
ex-post payoff amounts to qmax(p− cl)− [qv¯v¯ − V (σ, ω, qv¯)]. Taking expectations and
subtracting the seller’s investment level then yields the seller’s expected payoff. The
buyer’s expected payoff is equivalent to total social surplus minus the seller’s expected
payoff. If the contract specifies v¯ = vh, all units are non-conforming to the contract.
Thus, the seller’s ex-post payoff is given by qmax(p− cl)− [qmaxvh−V (σ, ω, qmax)]. The
parties’ expected payoff can be derived as before.
(ii) The second part of the proof can be performed in a similar way and is left to the
reader.
Proof of Proposition II.3
Proof of Proposition II.3. (i) The first statement is true, because, for all quality
thresholds v¯, the buyer’s expected payoff is equivalent to expected social surplus plus
or minus a constant term. Moreover, the second statement must also be true because
the seller’s expected payoff Sclvl(β, σ) = q
max(p − cl) − σ is strictly decreasing in σ.
To prove statement three, we first show that given the buyer invests efficiently the
difference of the seller’s expected surplus and expected social surplus
Sclvh(β∗, σ)− [E[W (β∗, σ, ω,Q∗(β∗, σ, ω))]− β∗ − σ]
= qmax(p− cl)− E[qmaxvh − V (σ, ω, qmax)]− E[W (β∗, σ, ω,Q∗(β∗, σ, ω))] + β∗
= qmax(p− cl − vh) + E[V (σ, ω, qmax)]− E[C(β∗, ω, qmax)]
− E[W (β∗, σ, ω,Q∗(β∗, σ, ω))] + E[C(β∗, ω, qmax)] + β∗
= qmax(p− cl − vh) + E[W (β∗, σ, ω, qmax)]− E[W (β∗, σ, ω,Q∗(β∗, σ, ω))] + β∗
= qmax(p− cl − vh) + E[W (β∗, σ, ω, qmax −Q∗(β∗, σ, ω))] + β∗
is monotonically increasing in σ. To see this, take any pair (σ
′
, σ
′′
) with σ
′
< σ
′′
and
note that
E[W (β∗, σ
′
, ω, qmax −Q∗(β∗, σ′ , ω))]
≤ E[W (β∗, σ′ , ω, qmax −Q∗(β∗, σ′′ , ω))]
≤ E[W (β∗, σ′′ , ω, qmax −Q∗(β∗, σ′′ , ω))].
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The first inequality follows because, for β∗, σ
′
and ω the quantity qmax −Q∗(β∗, σ′ , ω)
represents all units that yield a negative net joint profit. Thus, this quantity minimizes
ex-post social welfare. The second inequality follows from Assumption II.2. To see
this, recall that Assumption II.2 implies that expected welfare is increasing in σ for
any fixed quantity q > 0. Consider some state ω
′ ∈ Ω. Ex-post, together with β∗ and
σ
′
this state determines how many units are associated with a negative net joint profit.
Therefore, due to Assumption II.2, for quantity qmax−Q∗(β∗, σ′′ , ω′) it must hold that
E[W (β∗, σ
′
, ω
′
, qmax −Q∗(β∗, σ′′ , ω′))] ≤ E[W (β∗, σ′′ , ω′ , qmax −Q∗(β∗, σ′′ , ω′))].
(A.25)
Because (A.25) holds for any state, it must also hold for the expected value over all
states.
We have established that the difference between the seller’s expected surplus and
expected social welfare is increasing, hence it must hold for any σ < σ∗ that
Sclvh(β∗, σ)− [E[W (β∗, σ, ω,Q∗(β∗, σ, ω))]− β∗ − σ] ≤
Sclvh(β∗, σ∗)− [E[W (β∗, σ∗, ω,Q∗(β∗, σ∗, ω))]− β∗ − σ∗]
or equivalently
[E[W (β∗, σ∗, ω,Q∗(β∗, σ∗, ω))]− β∗ − σ∗]− [E[W (β∗, σ, ω,Q∗(β∗, σ, ω))]− β∗ − σ]
≤ Sclvh(β∗, σ∗)− Sclvh(β∗, σ). (A.26)
Because social welfare is uniquely maximized by (β∗, σ∗), the term in the first line of
(A.26) is positive and consequently Sclvh(β∗, σ) < Sclvh(β∗, σ∗) for all σ ∈ [0, σ∗). (ii)
The second part of the proof can be performed in a similar way and is left to the reader.
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3. Appendix to Chapter III
3.1. Comparison between private and efficient investment
Proof. Let us compare the landowner’s privately optimal investment level in absence
of the risk of a taking with the socially best response to the government’s investment
in the general case where a taking may occur. We prove that epL is, for any investment
of the government, at least as high as any eL ∈ eSBRL (eG). In absence of the risk of a
taking, the landowner’s optimal investment maximizes
epL ∈ arg max
e∈[0,emaxL ]
E[UpL(eL, ω, q)] = E[V (eL, ω)]− eL.
Take any eG ∈ [0, emaxG ] and note that
E[UpL(eL, ω, q)]− E[W (eL, eG, ω,Q∗(eL, eG, ω))] = E[min[V (eL, ω)− S(eG, ω), 0] + eG
is increasing in eL due to Assumption III.2. Let us denote the greatest element of
eSBRL (eG) by e
max
L (eG). Take any eL < e
max
L (eG) that is not a socially best response
itself. Then it must hold that
E[UpL(eL, ω, q)]− E[W (eL, eG, ω,Q∗(eL, eG, ω))] ≤
E[UpL(e
max
L (eG), ω, q)]− E[W (emaxL (eG), eG, ω,Q∗(emaxL (eG), eG, ω))].
Because
E[W (emaxL (eG), eG, ω,Q
∗(emaxL (eG), eG, ω))] > E[W (eL, eG, ω,Q
∗(eL, eG, ω))]
it must hold that
E[UpL(eL, ω, q)] < E[U
p
L(e
max
L (eG)ω, q)]
and consequently epL ≥ emaxL (eG).
Note that this directly implies epL ≥ e∗L. In a similar way one can show that the
government’s privately optimal investment level exceeds the socially best response to
any investment of the landowner. This directly implies epG ≥ e∗G.
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3.2. Proofs of Propositions and Lemmas
Proof of Theorem III.1
Proof. Let us prove that the landowner’s investment incentives, under the compensa-
tion regimes we considered in Chapter 3.3, can be ranked in the following way:
∀eL ∈ eSBCL : eFCL = epL ≥ eL ≥ eSOPV CL = e∗L ≥ eNCL = 0. (III.4)
In Appendix A.3.1, we explained that epL is, for any eG, at least as high as the greatest
element of eSBRL (eG). Because e
FC
L = e
p
L and the landowner’s best response under the
social benefit compensation regime is equivalent to the social best response, the first
claim directly follows. Let us establish that any eL ∈ eSBCL ≥ eSOPV CL = e∗L. To do so,
we consider the difference between the landowner’s expected payoff under the social
benefit compensation regime and expected social surplus. It is given by
E[USBCL (eL, 0, ω,Q
∗(eL, 0, ω))]− E[W (eL, e∗G, ω,Q∗(eL, e∗G, ω))] =
E[W (eL, 0, ω,Q
∗(eL, 0, ω))]− E[W (eL, e∗G, ω,Q∗(eL, e∗G, ω))] =
E[min[max[V (eL, ω), S(0, ω)]− S(e∗G, ω), 0]]
which is increasing in eL due to Assumption III.2. Note that we used that the govern-
ment invests zero under the SBC regime and that the socially best response to e∗L is
e∗G. Take any eL < e
∗
L, then
E[USBCL (eL, 0, ω,Q
∗(eL, 0, ω))]− E[W (eL, e∗G, ω,Q∗(eL, e∗G, ω))] ≤
E[USBCL (e
∗
L, 0, ω,Q
∗(e∗L, 0, ω))]− E[W (e∗L, e∗G, ω,Q∗(e∗L, e∗G, ω))].
Because expected welfare is uniquely maximized by (e∗L, e
∗
G), this implies
E[USBCL (eL, 0, ω,Q
∗(eL, 0, ω))] < E[USBCL (e
∗
L, 0, ω,Q
∗(e∗L, 0, ω))]
and consequently any eL ∈ eSBCL ≥ eSOPV CL = e∗L. Since eNCL = 0, it is clear that
eSOPV CL > e
NC
L . Similarly, we can rank the government’s investment incentives:
∀eG ∈ eFCG : eNCG = epG ≥ eSOPV CG = e∗G ≥ eG ≥ eSBCG = 0.
In Appendix A.3.1, we explained that epG ≥ e∗G. Because eNCG = epG and eSOPV CG = e∗G,
it directly follows that eNCG ≥ eSOPV CG . The proof that eSOPV CL is at least as high as
any eG ∈ eFCG can be done the same way we proved that any eL ∈ eSBCL ≥ eSOPV CL and
is left to the reader. Finally, any eG ∈ eFCG ≥ eSBCG , because eSBCG = 0.
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